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Article 
Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for 
Lemons? 
Darian M. Ibrahim† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Everything is online now—the way we connect with others, 
the way we shop, even some forms of education. We keep up 
with friends on Facebook we cannot see in person, buy light 
bulbs from Amazon rather than making a trip to the hardware 
store,1 and obtain an MBA at night on our computers from the 
comfort of our own home after the kids have gone to bed.2 One 
area that has initially resisted the move to cyberspace, howev-
er—eschewing the virtual world for the real one—is entrepre-
neurial finance.  
Venture capitalists (VCs) and angel investors have long 
valued close networks and personal relationships when select-
ing which entrepreneurs to fund, and they closely monitor their 
investments in person after they fund.3 These practices lead to 
intense locality in funding—i.e., investors funding entrepre-
 
†  Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. My thanks to Brian 
Broughman, Joan Heminway, Don Langevoort, Alan Meese, Nate Oman, Ja-
son Parsont, Gordon Smith, participants in a faculty workshop at Washington 
& Lee for helpful feedback on this Article. Special thanks to research assis-
tants Lauren Bridenbaugh, David Nangle, and Brian Reagan and law librari-
ans Fred Dingledy and Cheryl O‘Connor for their excellent research support. 
Copyright © 2015 by Darian M. Ibrahim.  
 1. See Trefis Team, Amazon Crumbles Brick and Mortar Stores, Stock 
Primed for Move to $233, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/12/09/amazon-crumbles-brick-and-mortar 
-stores-stock-primed-for-move-to-233. 
 2. See AUBURN UNIVERSITY MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
ONLINE, http://harbert.auburn.edu/academics/online-programs/mba-online 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015); THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL JD LAW COURS-
ES ONLINE, http://www.jmls.edu/academics/jd/jd-online.php (last visited Nov. 
2, 2015); KELLEY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ONLINE MBA, http://kelley.iu.edu/ 
onlineMBA/Online/MBA/page36790.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); OPEN YALE 
COURSES, http://oyc.yale.edu (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
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neurs in their own communities. But with everything else in 
society moving online, why not entrepreneurial finance? Can 
online platforms successfully match entrepreneurs and inves-
tors from different communities? Why does a Midwestern en-
trepreneur need to convince investors in Chicago to fund her 
startup when there are substantially more investors across the 
nation who may be interested? And on the flip side, the Inter-
net democratizes investing by allowing the majority of those 
without connections to angels or VCs the possibility of getting 
rich funding the next Facebook or Twitter.4 
Public opinion—and now the law—is highly supportive of 
the online ―crowdfunding‖ trend. In an age where bipartisan 
support for anything in Congress is uncommon, allowing entre-
preneurs to use the Internet to raise money is a rarity: every-
one seems to like it.5 The Jumpstart Our Businesses Startups 
(JOBS) Act6 passed with bipartisan support.7 The JOBS Act al-
lows general solicitation of accredited investors, a move that 
makes online matchmaking and investing legally possible in a 
way that it was not before.8 The Capital Raising Online While 
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosures (CROWD-
FUND) Act—part of the JOBS Act—goes even further and al-
lows even unaccredited investors to invest in startups without 
the safeguards that have always been provided to unaccredited 
investors under the securities laws.9 Crowdfunding is thought 
 
 4. See Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at C1 (quoting President Obama as calling crowdfunding 
a ―game changer‖ that allows ―ordinary Americans . . . to go online and invest 
in entrepreneurs they believe in‖). 
 5. See Tanya Prive, Inside the JOBS Act: Equity Crowdfunding, FORBES 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/ 
11/06/inside-the-jobs-act-equity-crowdfunding-2 (―The issue is entrepreneurs 
find it very difficult to access financing. . . . These portals could serve as a 
great vehicle for investing in small businesses, which are accountable for cre-
ating 65% of the net new jobs over the past 17 years.‖). 
 6. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–
305, 126 Stat. 307, 315–323 (2012) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o 
(2012)). 
 7. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obama Signs “JOBS Act” into Law, Calls It a 
“Game-Changer,” CBS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/obama-signs-jobs-act-into-law-calls-it-a-game-changer (―The bill passed 
Congress with bipartisan support. Republican lawmakers, including House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor, stood directly behind the president during the 
signing ceremony. ‗By increasing access to capital and reducing onerous regu-
lations, entrepreneurs and small business owners will have more ability to 
take risks, grow and create jobs,‘ Cantor said in a statement.‖). 
 8. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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to fill a funding gap for startups that cannot attract other fi-
nancing, or are too early in their life cycles to attract angels 
and VCs.10 
This Article examines the progression in entrepreneurial 
finance from: (1) traditional angel/VC operations through per-
sonal networks; to (2) online soliciting of accredited investors 
(JOBS Act Title II); to (3) full-blown crowdfunding to anyone 
who wishes to invest in a startup (JOBS Act Title III).11 This 
Article‟s first main contribution is to show that Title II sites are 
succeeding, and to explain why. Its second main contribution is 
to theorize about how Title III might play out when implement-
ed, and to suggest legal reforms to increase its chances for suc-
cess. 
The Article begins by defining ―crowdfunding‖ and distin-
guishing its two main types. Crowdfunding can be equity-based, 
meaning investors receive stock in a business in exchange for 
their money, or it can be non-equity based, when people either 
donate funds or obtain rewards in exchange for their contribu-
tions.12 From a legal perspective, equity crowdfunding is the far 
more interesting of the two types and is the type of crowdfund-
ing that this Article focuses on.13  
 
 10. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities 
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 101 (2012) (noting the ―unavailability of 
traditional sources of small business financing‖ for new startups); Thomas G. 
James, Far from the Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act Provide Meaning-
ful Redress to Small Investors for Securities Fraud in Connection with Crowd-
funding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1787 (2013) (―[C]rowdfunding fills a 
necessary funding gap for startups seeking needed capital . . . .‖). But see Jill 
E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 63 (1998) (―The inability of small businesses 
to find adequate capital may not indicate a market failure, however. The high 
failure rate of small businesses demonstrates the risky nature of small busi-
ness investment . . . .‖). 
 11. In my estimation, which is consistent with the nomenclature in the 
JOBS Act, Title II is a step toward crowdfunding but is not actually crowd-
funding. Title III, on the other hand, is crowdfunding and is the more contro-
versial and problematic of the JOBS Act changes. See Kendall Almerico, Want 
To Make Equity Crowdfunding Legal? 3 Experts Sound Off, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237000 (contending that 
as of late 2014, without Title III‘s implementation, ―equity crowdfunding‖ has 
not yet been made legal).  
 12. Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding‟s Curious Conun-
drum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 375 (2012) (noting that 
crowdfunding originated in the U.S. on the non-equity side); Chance Barnett, 
Crowdfunding Sites in 2014, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:11 PM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2014/08/29/crowdfunding-sites-in-2014. 
 13. There are other ways to break down and define the various types of 
crowdfunding. Bradford, supra note 10, at 14–27 (offering a fuller taxonomy of 
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With some understanding of our eventual target—equity 
crowdfunding—in mind, the Article then peers back to the time 
before online investing took hold. Expert angels and VCs oper-
ating in tight geographic networks, most notably Silicon Valley, 
have funded and advised Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter, 
Tesla Motors and virtually every other software, social media, 
and biotech company you can think of. What explains this suc-
cess? One answer is that intense geographic locality in tradi-
tional entrepreneurial finance mitigates investor risk both pre- 
and post-investment. It follows, then, that a major concern with 
crowdfunding is that the very thing touted about it—the democ-
ratization of investing through the Internet—eliminates the 
tight knit communities that have made entrepreneurial finance 
successful to date.  
Despite this foundational concern, entrepreneurial fi-
nance‘s move to cyberspace is inevitable. As startups need less 
money to ramp up,14 and because it is cheaper and more effi-
cient to raise money online than in person,15 startups will likely 
raise an increasingly large percentage of funds over the Inter-
net. This Article asks the normative question of whether this 
trend toward online fundraising is desirable, completing our 
progression from traditional investing to online investing by 
examining Titles II and III of the JOBS Act in turn. Do these 
laws adequately balance the SEC‘s twin goals of raising capital 
and investor protection, or do they skew too heavily toward the 
former?16 More pointedly, will Title III crowdfunding—the end 
goal of the legislation—turn into a market for ―lemons,‖17 exist-
ing only for low-quality startups and foolish investors? 
 
the various strains of crowdfunding). For my purposes, because equity crowd-
funding invokes the securities laws while other types do not, the non-equity 
types of crowdfunding are lumped together and not analyzed further. See 
Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the 
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned 
on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2012) (―Unlike raising 
money for charities or other nonprofit ventures, a business seeking investors 
through crowdfunding implicates the securities laws . . . .‖). 
 14. See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1457, 1471 (2013) (discussing the low promotion costs of online offerings).  
 16. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 1767 (―Exposing unsophisticated inves-
tors to risky investments without adequate disclosure unduly sacrifices inves-
tor-protection goals to the perceived need to lower the disclosure barriers for 
small businesses and crowdfunding techniques.‖). 
 17. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing 
how the market for ―lemons‖ problem intersects with quality differences and 
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Before reaching the more difficult question posed by Title 
III, I reveal that the less-radical Title II,18 which allows general 
solicitation of accredited investors, seems to have proven suc-
cessful for entrepreneurs and investors in its first year of oper-
ation. Online platforms such as AngelList, FundersClub, and 
CircleUp have successfully matched entrepreneurs and accred-
ited investors and raised significant cash for startups. This is 
somewhat surprising, at least in the first analysis, considering: 
(1) that moving operations online would appear to weaken the 
close networks and geographic locality that explain traditional 
angel/VC success; and (2) that the first Internet matching ser-
vice for startups and accredited investors, ACE-Net, failed mis-
erably over a decade ago.19  
I contend that, upon closer examination, Title II‘s success 
should not come as a surprise after all. The Title II sites that 
have been successful more closely resemble traditional angel 
investing rather than some new paradigm of entrepreneurial 
finance. AngelList, FundersClub, and Circle Up operate like 
traditional angels, they just do so online instead of in person. 
Title II platforms are simply taking advantage of the Internet to 
reduce the transaction costs of traditional angel and VC opera-
tions and add passive angels to their networks at a low cost. The 
key network players on Title II platforms are the same angels 
and VCs who invest offline, and the ―new‖ accredited investors 
being solicited are piggybacking on a select group‘s expertise. I 
show that ACE-Net failed because, even though it was limited 
to accredited investors, it more closely resembled a new net-
work without strong intermediaries and established players 
than the current Title II platforms. Conversely, Title II is suc-
ceeding because it is only a modest change in current practice.  
The analysis changes when we reach Title III, however. Ti-
tle III allows unaccredited investors to invest through online 
 
uncertainty). 
 18. This is not to say that Title II is without its concerns. See Usha Ro-
drigues, Securities Law‟s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3422–
25 (2013) (highlighting concerns with equating wealth and sophistication un-
der the accredited investors rule); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Lange-
voort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital 
Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2013) (expressing concerns about 
allowing general solicitation of accredited investors when their sophistication 
is in doubt given the ease of satisfying the accredited investor criteria). De-
spite concerns, Title II has gotten far less attention and criticism than Title 
III. 
 19. See infra notes 105–13 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
ACE-Net. 
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platforms without the traditional protections of the securities 
laws. While Title III is still in a holding pattern waiting for 
SEC rules to implement it,20 Title III represents a true equity 
crowdfunding situation and a paradigm shift in entrepreneurial 
finance. Title III crowdfunding is significantly different than 
Title II for three reasons: (1) Title III is more than moving ex-
isting networks online; unaccredited investors are not part of 
existing angel/VC networks, and thus their inclusion would 
form new networks of players unknown to each other; (2) given 
the sheer numbers of unaccredited vs. accredited investors, this 
would more closely resemble a non-expert based, ―wisdom of 
the crowds‖ situation than piggybacking on expert investors; 
and (3) given the foregoing, the identity and quality of the en-
trepreneurs, investors, and matchmaking sites under Title III 
might be different. Due to Title III‘s extreme departure from 
traditional entrepreneurial finance, there is a significant risk 
that it will fail as ACE-Net did. 
I argue that any such projections about Title III require 
more careful analysis. First, there are reasons to believe some 
high-quality entrepreneurs and investors will use Title III once 
it is implemented. Namely, some startups will be too early-
stage to seek financing from traditional angels or under Title 
II, and they might prefer Title III over bootstrapping or 
―friends and family‖ money. Another subset of high-quality 
startups might choose to unbundle the traditional investor‘s 
cash and value-added services (e.g., advice connections) and 
seek only cash under Title III without paying a premium for 
value-added services. Second, there is the related question of 
whether those high-quality Title III startups will be outnum-
bered by low-quality startups with no good way for unaccredit-
ed investors to distinguish between them. Should that happen, 
high-quality startups would not be valued appropriately, re-
sulting in their exit from Title III, leaving only ―lemons‖ re-
maining.21 I argue that the wisdom of crowds and strong inter-
mediation are two potential ways to solve the lemons problem 
under Title III.  
 
 20. Press Release, Congressman Jared Polis, Polis Issa Lead 26 Members 
of Congress in Letter Urging SEC to Implement Crowdfunding Rules (Aug. 12 
2014), http://polis.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=390763  
(―[A] bipartisan group of twenty-six colleagues, today sent a letter to Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Mary Jo White urging her to complete 
the ‗crowdfunding‘ rulemaking process . . . .‖). 
 21. See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
―lemons‖ problem. 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines crowdfund-
ing and discusses changes in the JOBS Act that make it legally 
possible. Part II peers back to the time before online investing 
to discuss why traditional angel and VC financing has been so 
successful. Part III uses the analytical framework developed in 
the previous Part to analyze Title II of the JOBS Act, which al-
lows for general solicitation of accredited investors over the In-
ternet. I conclude that, while puzzling on the surface, Title II is 
proving successful with good reason—Title II sites are really 
just existing angel and VC networks moved online to reduce the 
transaction costs of operation and add passive angels at a low 
cost. Part IV then analyzes Title III of the JOBS Act, the more 
radical crowdfunding provisions. I suggest that Title III 
might—but doesn‘t need to—turn into a market for lemons. I 
conclude by offering changes to Title III that could help avoid 
the lemons problem. 
I.  CROWDFUNDING DEFINED AND MADE LEGAL   
―Crowdfunding‖ may be commonly thought of as using the 
Internet to raise money for a product or cause. Businesses, po-
litical campaigns, and charitable organizations all use the In-
ternet to raise money. Crowdfunding adds a financing element 
to its precursor, ―crowdsourcing.‖22 Wikipedia and Yelp! are 
both crowdsourced projects.23 For both crowdsourcing and now 
crowdfunding, the ―crowd‖ part of the word implies using the 
wisdom of crowds as opposed to reliance on experts.24 This bot-
tom-up approach brings to mind prediction markets such as the 
Iowa prediction market.25 President Barack Obama successful-
 
 22. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1459 (―[C]rowdfunding has its origins 
in ‗crowdsourcing,‘ which is ‗a type of participative online activity in which an 
individual, an institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a 
group of individuals . . . via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a 
task.‘‖ (quoting Enrique Estellés-Arolas & Fernando Gonzáles-Ladrón-de-
Guevara, Towards an Integrated Crowdsourcing Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 
189, 197 (2012))). Another precursor is microlending (or microfinance). Brad-
ford, supra note 10, at 28. 
 23. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1459. 
 24. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY 
ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSI-
NESS, ECONOMICS, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 5–22 (2004) (discussing different 
ways of utilizing collective wisdom). 
 25. See Iowa Electronic Markets, UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF BUS., http://  
tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/markets (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); see also Michael 
Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Govern-
ance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1346–49 (2007) (applying the idea of pre-
diction markets to corporate governance). 
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ly used the Internet to raise record sums for his 2008 cam-
paign, an early example of a successful crowdfunding cam-
paign.26  
For purposes of this Article, I differentiate two main types 
of crowdfunding: non-equity based and equity-based. This Part 
will explore those two crowdfunding variations in turn, explain 
why equity crowdfunding is far more interesting from a legal 
perspective, and detail changes in the JOBS Act that have 
made equity crowdfunding legal. 
A. NON-EQUITY VS. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING 
Non-equity crowdfunding is when people donate money 
online or purchase products or experiences in exchange for con-
tributions to a project.27 For example, ―The Veronica Mars Mov-
ie Project‖ provided different prizes based on the amount of 
money a person donated, including t-shirts, a personalized vid-
eo greeting from a cast member, tickets to the movie premiere, 
or being an extra in the movie.28 Importantly, none of the back-
ers of a rewards crowdfunding project receive an interest (such 
as a share of the profits) in the project‘s later success.29  
Kickstarter and Indiegogo are two of the most popular non-
equity crowdfunding platforms. Kickstarter, the platform for 
the Veronica Mars movie, follows an ―all-or-nothing‖ funding 
approach, meaning that a project only gets funded if it raises 
all of the funds sought.30 Kickstarter is emphatic that it does 
 
 26. See Michael Luo, Small Online Contributions Add Up to Huge Fund-
raising Edge for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/02/20/us/politics/20obama.html (ironically describing Obama‘s campaign 
headquarters as having ―the feel of an Internet start-up‖). 
 27. See Barnett, supra note 12.  
 28. The Veronica Mars Movie Project, KICKSTARTER, http://www 
.kickstarter.com/projects/559914737/the-veronica-mars-movie-project/posts/ 
427900 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 29. Barnett, supra note 12. Despite the lack of a profit‘s share in the mov-
ie‘s eventual success, the Veronica Mars project raised its $2 million goal in 
just 11 hours. Erin Strecker, “Veronica Mars” Movie Is a Go, ENT. WKLY. (Mar. 
13, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.ew.com/article/2013/03/13/veronica-mars 
-movie-is-a-go-kickstarter. The project ultimately raised over $5.7 million and 
became the fifth highest grossing rewards crowdfunding project. Matthew 
Toren, 10 Crowdfunding Success Stories To Love, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 18, 
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/232234.  
 30. Kickstarter‘s success rate is just under 40%, with a majority of pro-
jects receiving less than 20% of their funding goal. Stats, KICKSTARTER http:// 
www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=footer (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Through 
Kickstarter, 95,092 projects totaling $2.05 billion have been successfully fund-
ed. See id. 
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not engage in equity crowdfunding,31 nor does it allow charita-
ble campaigns.32 Indiegogo is different in a couple of important 
respects. First, it allows projects to raise less than the full 
amount sought.33 Second, Indiegogo encourages charitable 
campaigning and offers a 25% discount to registered 501(c)(3) 
nonprofits.34  
Equity crowdfunding is different than non-equity crowd-
funding in a key way. In equity crowdfunding, investors con-
tribute money in exchange for a tangible interest in the venture 
they are funding, most often stock.35 Unlike traditional entre-
preneurial finance, where startups may be screened in person 
at a monthly meeting of angels, equity crowdfunding uses a vir-
tual platform to match investors and entrepreneurs. Because 
investors receive equity in exchange for their funds, they are 
purchasing ―securities,‖ and thus the securities laws regulate 
the transaction.36 
B. LEGAL CHANGES IN THE JOBS ACT THAT FACILITATE EQUITY  
CROWDFUNDING  
Harnessing the power of the Internet to raise capital for 
small businesses drove the bi-partisan support and easy pas-
 
 31. Our Rules, KICKSTARTER, http:// www.kickstarter.com/rules (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2015); Seven Things To Know About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, 
http://www.kickstarter.com/hello (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (―Creators keep 
100% ownership of their work. Backers are supporting projects to help them 
come to life, not to profit financially.‖). 
 32. Our Rules, supra note 31. 
 33. INDIEGOGO, http://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015). Indiegogo allows either ―Flexible‖ or ―Fixed‖ Funding. Under the ―Fixed 
Funding‖ model, project creators must raise the full amount sought to keep 
any of the funds, like Kickstarter. Under the ―Flexible Funding‖ model, project 
creators can raise and keep less than the full amount sought. See How Much 
Does Indiegogo Cost? Fees & Pricing, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo 
.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408-Fees-Pricing (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Equity crowdfunding is the focus of this Article, although ―debt crowd-
funding‖ may not be far behind. See Amy Cortese, The Crowdfunding Crowd 
Is Anxious, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/ 
06/business/crowdfunding-for-small-business-is-still-an-unclear-path.html 
(―Much of the crowdfunding focus has been on equity—selling shares in start-
ups—but SoMoLend is betting that loans to expanding small businesses are a 
bigger opportunity. Equity crowdfunding will be ‗minuscule compared to the 
impact crowdfunding will have on debt financing,‘ says Candace Klein, SoMo-
Lend‘s founder and C.E.O. ‗We think this is literally going to change the bank-
ing system.‘‖). Debt financing is not to be confused with microlending, which 
does not implicate the securities laws. 
 36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
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sage of the JOBS Act.37 Prior to the JOBS Act, the securities 
laws contained two main roadblocks to equity crowdfunding: 
the ban on general solicitation in Rule 506 private offerings and 
the strict rules for selling to unaccredited investors in such of-
ferings. 
1. Title II: Allowing General Solicitation of Accredited  
Investors 
First, while Regulation D38 and Rule 50639 promulgated 
under the Securities Act of 1933 allow startups to raise money 
in private offerings without SEC registration, they do not allow 
startups to seek potential investors through ―general solicita-
tion or general advertising.‖40 ―To avoid making a general solic-
itation, [an entrepreneur] must have a preexisting, substantive 
relationship with the potential investor.‖41  
It is easy to see how the general solicitation ban would pre-
sent a problem when the Internet is involved. How can an en-
trepreneur have a preexisting relationship with every angel or 
VC who might view his information online? The short answer is 
that he cannot. As a 2006 report on Rule 506 and general solici-
tation noted, the ban on general solicitation ―prohibits issuers 
from taking advantage of the tremendous efficiencies and reach 
of the Internet to communicate with potential investors.‖42  
Title II of the JOBS Act solves the general solicitation 
problem, which has long been seen as a hindrance to small 
 
 37. The initial form of the JOBS Act bill was passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives after only one day of consideration. 158 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily 
ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (indicating H.R. 3606 was passed 390-23 on March 8, with 
consideration beginning on March 7). 
 38. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506 (2014). 
 39. Id. § 230.506; see also Abraham J. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why 
Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
107, 132 (2010) (―The exemption from registration that most startup compa-
nies rely on is Rule 506 of Regulation D . . . .‖). 
 40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
 41. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 717, 756 (2010); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: 
The Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered Of-
ferings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 6 (1998) (commenting 
on general solicitation that ―there has consistently been a dominant message: 
the ‗pre-existing relationship‘ test is the key‖). 
 42. ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. COS., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE UNITED STATES SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 75 (Apr. 23, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/ 
info/smallbus/ascpc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.  
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businesses raising capital.43 Title II removes the ban on general 
solicitation in 506 offerings provided only accredited investors 
are solicited, and that there are ―reasonable steps to verify‖ the 
accredited status of the investors.44 By removing Rule 506‘s ban 
on general solicitation, online investing in limited form (due to 
the accredited investor restriction) became possible.45 
2. Title III: Easing Sales to Unaccredited Investors 
To obtain a true equity crowdfunding situation, the majori-
ty of us unaccredited investors must be allowed to participate 
in startup offerings. The Internet can be a powerful tool to use 
the wisdom of crowds to identify and fund the next big idea, but 
a true crowd-based approach requires opening up the process to 
more than accredited investors. Currently most Rule 506 offer-
ings, and virtually all startups‘ sales to angels and VCs, are 
limited to accredited investors due to the disclosure and other 
requirements involved when bringing unaccredited investors 
into the mix.46 While accredited investors are thought to be 
 
 43. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It‟s Time To Al-
low General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1 (2004); JD Alois, CircleUp: 40 Companies and $40 Million Funded, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/ 
2014/09/50858-circleup-40-companies-40-million (noting that Title II of the 
JOBS Act allowance of general solicitation ―was an incredibly important 
change that finally allowed online investment crowdfunding portals to truly 
come to life‖). 
 44. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 
126 Stat. 306, 309 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d) (instructing the SEC to 
remove the ―prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising‖ 
under Rule 506). Another change is enhancing the issuer‘s belief that an in-
vestor is accredited, which the issuer must now take ―reasonable steps to veri-
fy.‖ Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Ad-
vertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 55,464, 54,467 
(Sept. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (―[R]easonable steps 
. . . . [is] an objective determination, based on the particular facts and circum-
stances of each transaction. . . . [F]actors include: [1.] the nature of the pur-
chaser and the type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to be; [2.] 
the amount and type of information that the issuer has about the purchaser; 
and [3.] the nature of the offering, such as the manner in which the purchaser 
was solicited to participate in the offering, and the terms of the offering, such 
as a minimum investment amount.‖ (bullet points omitted)). 
 45. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014). 
 46. Even before the JOBS Act, startups did not have to make disclosures 
to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2014); Interpretative Re-
lease on Regulation D, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045, 10,045 (Mar. 10, 1983) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R pt. 231) (―[I]f accredited investors are the only purchasers in 
offerings under Rules 505 and 506, Regulation D does not require delivery of 
specific disclosure . . . .‖); see also Rodrigues, supra note 18, at 3394 (―U.S. se-
curities law has always allowed wealthy investors to enter certain markets 
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able to fend for themselves, unaccredited investors are not, and 
that is the basis for their differing legal treatment.47  
Title III of the JOBS Act would make it possible, for the 
first time, for unaccredited investors to purchase equity in nas-
cent startups through the Internet. Title III directs the SEC to 
promulgate rules to implement this broad and significant 
change, although no rules have yet been made.48 Title III per-
mits limited deregulated offerings by reducing the issuer dis-
closures that Rule 506 has long required.49 This sweeping 
change in unaccredited investor protection has led to fears that 
unaccredited investors will supply ―dumb money‖ into low-
quality or fraudulent startups.50 Such fears explain the holdup 
in the SEC passing rules to implement Title III.51  
Title III attempts to limit the downside for unaccredited 
investors in a novel way—by specifying how much they can 
purchase in Title III startups in any given year. For investors 
with annual incomes below $100,000, that cap is $2000 or 5% of 
their income, whichever is greater.52 Investors with annual in-
comes over $100,000 can invest the greater of $10,000 or 10% of 
their income.53 While the final result on Title III is unclear at 
the current time, and provisions may be subject to change,54 al-
 
(including not only the market for private company investments . . . while cor-
doning off average (retail) investors from the same opportunities.‖). 
 47. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953); Rodrigues, 
supra note 18, at 3417–22 (tracing the history of the accredited investor ex-
emption in private placements). 
 48. Palmiter, supra note 12, at 394 n.78 (―The SEC has been charged with 
drafting regulations to enact the crowdfunding provisions . . . .‖). Just before 
the publication of this Article, the SEC released final rules to permit crowd-
funding, however these rules had not yet been published in the Federal Regis-
ter. See SEC, Crowdfunding Final Rule (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec 
.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf. 
 49. See infra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.  
 50. Hazen, supra note 13, at 1766 (―[T]he solicitation of small investors is 
likely to attract unsophisticated investors who are in need of the investor pro-
tection provisions generally found in the securities laws.‖). 
 51. There is a risk of fraud in Title III, especially considering that ―[t]he 
JOBS Act exemptions bear some resemblance to the old Rule 504, which al-
lowed ‗non-reporting issuers to offer and sell securities to an unlimited num-
ber of persons without regard to their sophistication or experience and without 
delivery of any specified information.‘ The old Rule 504 enabled widespread 
fraud . . . .‖ Sherief Morsy, Note, The JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: How Nar-
rowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
1373, 1380 (2014). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Equity Crowdfunding Improvement Act of 2014, H.R. 4564, 113th 
Cong. (2014), http://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr4564-113/text (last visited 
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lowing unaccredited investors to participate in a meaningful 
way in online investing is a necessary step to achieving true 
equity crowdfunding. 
II.  TRADITIONAL ANGEL AND VC INVESTING   
Having described equity crowdfunding and the legal 
changes under the JOBS Act that are making it possible, this 
Article now shifts its focus to the normative question of wheth-
er equity crowdfunding is desirable. The analytical framework 
used to evaluate this normative question is that of traditional 
entrepreneurial finance. Why is startup investing so difficult, 
and what made angels and VCs so successful before online plat-
forms came into existence?  
Part A discusses the significant risks involved in funding 
early-stage startups. Without being able to manage these risks, 
rational investors would not fund these businesses. Part B ex-
plains how VCs have managed these risks through the use of 
detailed investment contracts. Part C explains how, in contrast, 
angel investors use informal means to manage the same risks.  
A. THE TRIO OF RISKS IN FUNDING STARTUPS 
As Ronald Gilson was the first to explain, early-stage 
startups present extreme levels of uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and agency costs.55 Startups present uncertainty 
both because they are new, and thus have no track records, and 
because they are often high-tech, which adds the element of 
technological uncertainty.56 There is information asymmetry, 
meaning the entrepreneur knows more than his investors, 
again due to the lack of a track record and perhaps a new tech-
nology.57 While uncertainty and information asymmetry are ex 
ante (or pre-) investment problems, agency costs present them-
selves ex post (or post-) investment. Agency costs are the fear 
that post-investment, the entrepreneur will act (with the inves-
tors‘ money) in a way that benefits himself and not the inves-
 
Nov. 2, 2015); see also Samuel Guzik, JOBS Act 2.0: Congressman McHenry‟s 
Cure for the “Six Deadly Sins” of Crowdfunding Regulation, CROWDFUNDING 
INSIDER (May 5, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/05/ 
37673-jobs-act-2-0-congressman-mchenrys-cure-six-deadly-sins-crowdfunding 
-regulation.  
 55. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from 
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003). 
 56. Id. at 1076–77. 
 57. Id. at 1077. 
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tors.58 Of course all investors face these problems, but startup 
investors face them in spades due to the unique nature of 
startups.  
B. HOW VCS MITIGATE THE RISKS OF STARTUP INVESTMENTS 
VCs mitigate these extreme risks in startup investing 
through the use of detailed investment contracts. Staged fi-
nancing, or releasing money over time once a startup achieves 
certain pre-set milestones, makes the startup‘s prospects clear-
er before subsequent funds are released and reduces the entre-
preneur‘s informational advantage.59 Staged financing also in-
centivizes the entrepreneur to succeed in order to receive more 
funds, therefore also reducing agency costs.60 Staged financing 
is thus a powerful tool VCs use for mitigating risk in startup 
funding.61 
In addition to staged financing, VCs take preferred stock 
with liquidation preferences in exchange for their investments, 
which signals the entrepreneur‘s belief that the startup will be 
worth more than these preferences.62 VCs also contract for 
board representation that likely exceeds the number of direc-
tors they could elect by voting their shares.63 Due to the 
preeminence of the board in corporate governance, the VC‘s 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1078–79; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial 
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture 
Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 304 (2003) (discussing VCs‘ use 
of staged financing). 
 60. Gilson, supra note 55, at 1079–80. 
 61. Michael Klausner and Kate Litvak describe staged financing as the 
―[m]ost important‖ of all the VC‘s risk-reduction techniques. Michael Klausner 
& Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Con-
tracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 56 (Michael 
J. Whincop ed., 2001) (―Most important among these contract terms is the 
staged nature of the venture capital investment.‖); see also Fisch, supra note 
10, at 61 (―Active involvement together with staged financing allows venture 
capitalists to address the information and agency problems of the small busi-
ness better than public equity.‖). 
 62. Klausner & Litvak, supra note 61.  
 63. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Con-
trol in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2006) (arguing that so-called 
―independent‖ directors on startup boards are often chosen by the VC and are 
likely to side with the VC in any contested board vote, giving the VC control of 
the board in more cases than it would otherwise appear); cf. Brian J. Brough-
man, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 
461, 462–63 (2010) (showing that VCs have less control over the appointment 
of independent directors than is commonly thought). 
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board control also reduces agency costs.64 VCs also employ oth-
er formal mechanisms, such as protective provisions that allow 
them to control exit decisions, which likewise mitigate the trio 
of investment problems that would otherwise make startup in-
vestments undesirable.65 
C. HOW ANGELS MITIGATE THE RISKS OF STARTUP  
INVESTMENTS 
As I have previously written, angel investors fund startups 
that are even earlier stage and thus present even higher de-
grees of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency 
costs.66 Yet angels use none of the VC‘s contractual protections 
to guard their investments.67 This is, in important part, be-
cause angels use informal means of reducing investment 
risks.68  
First, ex ante, angels generally invest only in technical are-
as with which they are familiar, thus reducing uncertainty and 
the entrepreneur‘s informal advantage.69 Angels are experts in 
the technical fields they invest in, usually having made their 
investment capital from a successful exit in their own startup.70 
Angels also get their deal flow from a network of trusted advi-
sors. This network ―serves an important screening and sorting 
function by funneling high-quality deals to angels while exclud-
 
 64. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559 n.65 (2003). 
 65. Gilson, supra note 55, at 1084–85. 
 66. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel In-
vestors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (2008) (―[B]ecause angels invest at an 
earlier stage than venture capitalists, when a start-up has no operating histo-
ry whatsoever, [this trio of] problems [is] even more acute than at the time 
venture capitalists invest.‖). 
 67. See id. at 1421 (―[T]he investment contracts used by traditional angels 
differ dramatically from those used by venture capitalists because they pro-
vide far less investor protection.‖). 
 68. Angels eschew detailed investment contracts for other reasons, too, 
including that aggressive contracts could hinder follow-on VC investments and 
because angel investments are too small to justify elaborate protective devices. 
See id. at 1428–31 (discussing the need for follow-on VC funding); id. at 1433–
35 (discussing the cost of contracting). 
 69. See id. at 1431–32; see also Fisch, supra note 10, at 86 (―[A]ngels fre-
quently have substantial expertise in the industry in which they invest.‖). 
 70. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1419 (―Most angels are ex-entrepreneurs 
themselves . . . .‖). Compare that with VCs, who are usually finance types ra-
ther than ex-entrepreneurs. MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, 
ANGEL INVESTING 109 (Jossey-Bass Inc. 2000) (observing that ―venture capi-
talists for the most part have little entrepreneurial experience‖ and are in-
stead ―financial MBA-types‖). 
IBRAHIM_4fmt 1/3/2016 1:00 PM 
576 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:561 
 
ing low-quality deals.‖71 Angels also screen startups in-person 
(perhaps several times).72  
Second, ex post, angels routinely visit and engage with the 
entrepreneurs they fund, which reduces agency costs.73 As An-
drew Wong has noted, angels invest no more than a two-hour 
drive from their investments,74 and this creates a ―localized 
bond of trust . . . . . .[that makes] formal control mechanisms 
unnecessary.‖75 Importantly, entrepreneurs have traditionally 
wanted angel participation (and VC participation through the 
board).76 The value-added services angels and VCs provide 
through their advice, experiences, connections, and empathy 
are said to be as important to entrepreneurs as the investors‘ 
money.77 The need for value-added services from investors be-
comes important to our story later.78 
III.  WHY TITLE II SITES ARE SUCCEEDING   
The previous Part explained why traditional angel and VC 
investing has worked so well prior to the rise of online plat-
forms for startup investing. However, any realist must 
acknowledge that entrepreneurial finance‘s move to cyberspace 
is inevitable.79 As it becomes possible to fund startups with less 
cash, the VC‘s deep pockets are no longer necessary. Further-
more, it is cheaper and more efficient to raise money online, 
thus allowing entrepreneurs to spend less time fundraising and 
more time developing their businesses. But despite these ad-
vantages, will Title II work without following the traditional 
Silicon-Valley blueprint? This Part discusses Title II‘s success 
 
 71. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1432. 
 72. Id. at 1444. 
 73. Id. at 1433. 
 74. MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR., VENTURE SUPPORT SYSTEMS PROJECT: 
ANGEL INVESTORS 32 (Feb. 2000), http://ocw/mit/edu/courses/sloan-school-of 
-management/15-975-special-seminar-in-management-the-nuts-and-bolts-of 
-business-plans-january-iap-2005/readings/angelreport.pdf (―Most active an-
gels will not invest in opportunities outside a 1-2 hour driving range.‖). 
 75. Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE 
CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 347–64 (Doug-
las Cumming ed., 2010). 
76.  Gilson, supra note 55, at 1075 (―[T]he venture capital fund‘s noncash 
contributions have special value to early stage companies.‖). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Sean M. O‘Connor, Crowdfunding‟s Impact on Start-Up IP Strate-
gy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 896 (2014) (―Notwithstanding . . . criticisms, 
enterprise crowdfunding will become a reality sooner rather than later, and 
tech start-ups will be among the first to explore using it.‖). 
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so far and contends that on close examination it is not all that 
surprising. 
A. TITLE II SITES SUCCESS SO FAR 
Several Title II sites have come into existence since the 
JOBS Act was passed. By any measure, including funds raised 
by these sites for their own operations and startups using these 
sites to successfully raise funds, these Title II sites are off to a 
promising start. According to one observer, ―investments made 
through crowdfunding platforms have grown each quarter and 
will continue to grow.‖80 The most notable of these sites include 
AngelList, FundersClub, and CircleUp. 
AngelList has an interesting history. Naval Ravikant, the 
co-founder, originally ―co-founded Epinions, an early online re-
views site, but felt cheated out of proceeds from the company‘s 
sale to EBay.‖81 After a lawsuit against their VC backers in 
Epinions, ―Ravikant channeled his disappointment into a blog 
called Venture Hacks . . . [which] offered dealmaking tips to 
startups.‖82 In 2010 VentureHacks became AngelList, which 
went from widely distributed e-mail to a networking website.83 
In 2013 alone, ―500 startups raised $125 million‖ through An-
gelList, according to Ravikant.84 AngelList has rivals, such as 
Gust, but ―so far, no one has replicated the appeal of Angel-
List.‖85 
FundersClub bills itself as an online venture capital firm. 
By mid-2013, FundersClub (accelerated through the well-
known Y Combinator out of Silicon Valley86) had ―raised $6.5 
million for itself‖ and ―also collected $7.2 million for its 31 port-
 
 80. Kay Koplovitz, Equity Crowdfunding at Year One, What‟s the Impact?, 
FORBES (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kaykoplovitz/2014/09/26/ 
equity-crowdfunding-at-year-one-whats-the-impact (quoting Luan Cox, co-
founder and CEO of Crowdnetic).  
 81. Brad Stone, AngelList, the Social Network for Startups, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-16/ angel-
list-the-social-network-for-startups.  
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Andrew Davidson, Follow the Money: AngelList Has Blown Open Ear-
ly-Stage Investments, WIRED (May 17, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/  
magazine/archive/2013/05/features/follow-the-money. 
 86. For a history of Y Combinator, see RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH 
PAD: INSIDE Y COMBINATOR, SILICON VALLEY‘S MOST EXCLUSIVE SCHOOL FOR 
STARTUPS (2012). 
IBRAHIM_4fmt 1/3/2016 1:00 PM 
578 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:561 
 
folio companies from its crowd of 6,700 investors.‖87 ―In Febru-
ary [2014], the company released its first prediction of return 
on investment for funders on the platform—41.2%.‖88 
CircleUp, itself a successful startup (also accelerated 
through Y Combinator),89 claims that since its launch in 2012 it 
has raised over $40 million for 40 startups.90 CircleUp does not 
raise money for tech-based companies, instead focusing on con-
sumer products companies,91 but, importantly, it still caters to 
growth startups as opposed to lifestyle firms. As CircleUp‘s co-
founder explains, ―[w]e don‘t have any companies on the site 
who are looking at it as a lifestyle business,‖ noting that ―typi-
cally these companies will exit to a private equity fund or stra-
tegic acquisition.‖92  
Several other Title II platforms join AngelList, Fun-
dersClub, and CircleUp as innovators in this space. For exam-
ple, Microventures, described as ―an online venture capital 
platform,‖93 had raised over $50 million for its portfolio compa-
 
 87. Josh Constine, FundersClub Ditches Dumb Money by Going Invite-
Only, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/16/  
fundersclub-invite-only. 
 88. Laura Baverman, FundersClub Fills Void for Start-Up Investors, USA 
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/ 
03/17/baverman-funders-club-online-venture-fund/6291007. 
 89. See Lora Kolodny, CircleUp Raises $14M To Crowdfund Anything but 
Tech, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Mar. 26, 2014), http:// 
blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/03/26/circleup-raises-14m-to-crowdfund 
-anything-but-tech (noting the $14M Series B financing CircleUp raised from 
Canaan Partners and others, including previous backers ―Google Ventures, 
Union Square Ventures, Maveron and Rose Park Advisors‖); Lora Kolodny, 
Johnson & Johnson Partners with CircleUp for Early Look at Startups, WALL 
ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (July 31, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/  
venturecapital/2014/07/31/johnson-johnson-partners-with-circleup-for-early 
-look-at-startups (noting that 4,000 startups have applied to raise funds on 
CircleUp as of mid-2014, and that CircleUp has partnered with consumer 
products giant Johnson & Johnson). 
 90. Alois, supra note 43.  
 91. See Lora Kolodny, Collaborative Fund, CircleUp Partner To Invest $4 
Million in B Corps, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/08/18/collaborative-fund-circleup 
-partner-to-invest-4-million-in-b-corps (describing CircleUp as ―the fundrais-
ing platform for ‗anything but tech‘ startups‖). 
 92. Christine Lagorio-Chafkin, CircleUp Draws More Investors as Equity 
Crowdfunding Gains Ground, INC.COM (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.inc.com/  
christine-lagorio/circleup-bright-spot-crowdfunding.html.  
 93. JD Alois, Microventures Claims $50 Million Equity Crowdfunding 
Milestone, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider 
.com/2014/09/49869-microventures-claims-50-million-equity-crowdfunding 
-milestone.  
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nies as of September 2014.94 Other Title II sites include We Are 
Crowdfunding,95 WeFunder,96 and EarlyShares97 who have all 
enjoyed early success.  
B. THE PUZZLE: SUCCEEDING YET NOT FOLLOWING THE  
BLUEPRINT 
The success of Title II is somewhat surprising, at least on 
first analysis. It would appear that moving operations online 
would weaken the close networks and geographic locality that 
explain traditional angel/VC success. If an angel investor from 
Virginia funds a startup in Silicon Valley—the very geographic 
dispersion the Internet is meant to foster—the angel can no 
longer use traditional pre- and post-investment risk-reducing 
mechanisms. Relatedly, history is not on the side of Title II. 
The first attempt at an Internet matching service for entrepre-
neurs and angels, ACE-Net, failed miserably over a decade 
ago.98  
To tie back into our discussion in the previous Part, con-
sider the inapplicability of the VC model to Title II funded 
startups. Title II sites are catering to the modern startup—the 
―capital-efficient‖ startup.99 It is now the case that many 
startups need less money to launch and grow.100 For example, 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Janet Levaux, RCAP‟s Crowdfunding Site: A Smart Move?, THINKAD-
VISOR (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2014/09/08/rcaps 
-crowdfunding-site-a-smart-move (―We Are Crowdfunding . . . lets accredited 
investors and others buy public and private offerings online by pooling their 
resources.‖).  
 96. Ryan Lawler, Y Combinator-Backed WeFunder Launches To Bring 
Crowdfunding Startups to the Masses, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2013), http:// 
techcrunch.com/2013/03/19/wefunder-launch.  
 97. Samantha Hurst, Electric Vehicle Technology Company Brammo 
Chooses Equity Crowdfunding Platform EarlyShares for Its $3 Million Capital 
Raise, CROWD FUND INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider 
.com/2014/09/50820-electric-vehicle-technology-company-brammo-chooses 
-equity-crowdfunding-platform-earlyshares-3-million-capital-raise.  
 98. See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text. 
 99. Another way of describing these startups is ―lean.‖ The ―lean startup‖ 
develops a base product then adapts the product quickly based on consumer 
feedback. See ERIC REIS, THE LEAN STARTUP: HOW TODAY‘S ENTREPRENEURS 
USE CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSI-
NESSES 8–11 (2011) (summarizing the lean startup method). See generally 
Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Startups Reject Venture Capital?, 3 
MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251, 256–57 (2013) (noting ―capital-
efficient‖ startups are the new reality and that deep pockets are no longer nec-
essary). 
 100. Many startups may be able to ―bootstrap‖ their way to profitability, 
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the cost of launching a software startup has diminished greatly 
over the past decade.101 One important driver is the advent of 
cloud computing, which allows startups to avoid purchasing 
expensive servers and to ―manage various functions in a cost-
efficient way.‖102 Also, the hottest sector these days, social me-
dia and entertainment (including app development), requires 
little capital to launch compared to ―capital-intensive‖ sectors 
such as biotech and clean technology.103 For these technologies, 
incubators and accelerators like Y Combinator are also helping 
to fast-track startup development.104 
The VC model does not work well for cash-efficient 
startups. VCs have historically not invested in a Series A 
round105 for less than $5 million due to the returns they seek 
and human capital (e.g., board representation) required for 
each investment.106 Recall that once they invest, VCs rely on 
detailed investment contracts whose most important protection 
 
even if it is a slower climb. According to one author, ―[t]he most dangerous and 
insidious thing that‘s happening with our entrepreneurs today is that they 
come out of school and believe that they cannot build a business without [debt 
or venture] capital.‖ Gwen Moran, Go It Alone, ENTREPRENEUR MAG., Aug. 
2012, at 66–67 (quoting author Dileep Rao); see Kelvin W. Willoughby, How 
Do Entrepreneurial Technology Firms Really Get Financed, and What Differ-
ence Does It Make?, 5 INT‘L. J. INNOVATION & TECH. MGMT. 1, 6 (2008) (argu-
ing that unorthodox bootstrap financing is the leading type of entrepreneurial 
finance for tech firms). 
 101. Ibrahim, supra note 99, at 256; see also Abraham J.B. Cable, Incuba-
tor Cities: Tomorrow‟s Economy, Yesterday‟s Start-ups, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUI-
TY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 227 (2013) (―The most notable lean-start-up suc-
cesses are Internet-related companies. But the principles are intended to be 
more generally applicable.‖). 
 102. John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture 
Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 156 (2014); see also Cable, supra note 101, at 
226 (―The wide availability of cloud computing services from large vendors like 
Amazon can eliminate the need to obtain and maintain expensive equip-
ment.‖). 
 103. See Ibrahim, supra note 99, at 257. 
 104. See KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLU-
TION: SOCIAL NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 57 (2010) (―Have you 
noticed that of recent, incubator-style funding mechanisms are popping up 
everywhere like weeds?‖). 
 105. The ―Series A‖ round is typically the first round of serious capital from 
professional investors. 
 106. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and False Di-
chotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 98 n.225 (2006) (―For in-
stance, for all of the primary VC investment sectors, the average size of a first-
round equity financing increased from approximately $1 million in 1980 to 
over $5.2 million in 2003 in inflation-adjusted dollars.‖). Of course early-stage 
VCs who act more like angel groups will have a lower minimum investment. 
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may be staged financing.107 If a startup requires less than the 
VC‘s first-round investment for its entire life cycle, the VC‘s de-
tailed contracts and staged financing do not work. 
Now consider the seeming inapplicability of the angels‘ 
model to Title II startups. Ex ante, angels rely on personal con-
nections and networks of trust to screen investments. The In-
ternet, however, is impersonal and negates the traditional in-
timacy in angel deal flow. Ex post, angels routinely participate 
in venture development, visiting the startup frequently and 
talking through problems with entrepreneurs. Again, the lack 
of locality brought on by the Internet makes such participation 
impossible, thus removing another informal means of risk re-
duction available to the online investor. 
Indeed, this analysis explains why ACE-Net, the first In-
ternet matching service for entrepreneurs and angels, failed. 
ACE-Net was launched over fifteen years ago and was made 
possible even before Title II under a no-action letter from the 
SEC.108 ACE-Net was described as a ―cross between a blind-
dating service and an initial public offering.‖109 It was a joint 
project of several government agencies (although driven by the 
Small Business Administration) and was limited to accredited 
investors.110 Yet ACE-Net died a slow death.111 The postmor-
tem was summed up nicely by securities lawyer Mark Hiraide, 
who noted that ―[W]ithout an active connection between entre-
preneurs and the investment community, deals did not get 
 
 107. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
 108. Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, [1997 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,305, at ¶ 77,516 (Oct. 25, 
1996). 
 109. Dennis Berman, ACE-Net: A Tough Way To Find an Angel, BUS. WK. 
(Aug. 13, 1998), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/news/date/9808/ 
e980813a.htm. 
 110. Zoltan J. Acs & Fred A. Tarpley Jr., The Angel Capital Electronic 
Network (ACE-Net), 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 793, 795 (1998) (―ACE-Net is a 
partnership between the Office of Advocacy, the US Small Business Admin-
istration, and US Department of Defense, in collaboration with the [SEC and 
state securities administrations].‖); Fisch, supra note 10, at 64 (―ACE-Net, the 
Small Business Administration‘s Internet-based matching service, was devel-
oped . . . to facilitate the matching of angel investors with small businesses 
seeking capital.‖). 
 111. David Worrell, Guardian Angels, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 28, 2005), 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/76266 (―After the SBA gave up its central 
role in the organization in 2000, the ACE-Net website seemed to be more or 
less abandoned and neglected.‖); see id. (noting that a second attempt was 
made when ACE-Net was revamped as ―Active Capital‖ with a new web ad-
dress). When I checked on November 2, 2015, that website no longer existed. 
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done.‖112 This would seem to confirm the necessity of close net-
works for entrepreneurial finance‘s success. ACE-Net will be 
discussed again in more depth later.113 
C. THE SOLUTION: WHY TITLE II SITES ARE SUCCEEDING 
Despite the seeming divergence between traditional an-
gel/VC models of risk reduction and Title II, I revealed that Ti-
tle II sites appear to be succeeding. What explains this success? 
My argument is that on closer examination, Title II sites are 
still acting under the traditional angel model in important re-
spects, even if there are differences.114 Title II sites could fairly 
be described as traditional angel networks that have migrated 
online for two reasons: 1) to reduce the transaction costs of op-
erations; and 2) to add new, passive angels at a low cost. 
1. Title II Sites Are Really the Same As Traditional  
Entrepreneurial Finance 
Title II sites are replicating angel risk-reduction mecha-
nisms in an online setting. First, consider the angel‘s tradition-
al means of reducing uncertainty and information asymmetry 
pre-investment. Angels rely on networks of trusted associates 
and their own expertise to find high-quality deal flow. How is 
this replicated online? To answer, we must first understand the 
difference between ―active‖ and ―passive‖ angels. Angels have 
always invested in small groups, or syndicates, that include a 
mix of active angels and passive angels.115 Active angels are the 
lead investors—they likely have expertise in the technology at 
hand, conduct the due diligence, and negotiate the terms of the 
investment. Passive angels, on the other hand, are along for the 
ride, contributing their cash but piggybacking on the active an-
gel‘s expertise and reputations.116 
 
 112. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Af-
fairs, 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Mark T. Hiraide, Partner, Petillon, 
Hiraide & Loomis, LLP). 
 113. See infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text. 
 114. It makes sense that the angel model would translate better to Title II. 
As Paul Graham, founder of Y Combinator, notes, ―Venture capitalists are fast 
followers . . . [who] don‘t try to predict what will win. They just try to notice 
quickly when something is already winning. But angels have to be able to pre-
dict.‖ STROSS, supra note 86, at 86–87. 
 115. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1424 (―Angels have long syndicated their 
investments with angel investment teams comprised of anywhere from six to 
twelve ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ angels.‖). 
 116. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 62 (―Angels range from financially sophis-
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Applying this to Title II sites, what we find is that our hy-
pothetical Virginia investor is likely a passive angel who is con-
tributing cash but nothing else. Ex ante, an active angel (or 
equivalent) is doing the screening and selecting of the startup. 
Consider FundersClub as an example. FundersClub has an 
―Investment Committee‖ that prescreens startups that wish to 
list on the site.117 In fact, that Investment Committee accepts 
less than two percent of startups that seek to list on Fun-
dersClub‘s site.118 In addition to its own expertise, Fun-
dersClub‘s Investment Committee is relying on its own network 
of trust. So far, it has only listed startups that have graduated 
from a top accelerator.119 This process of obtaining high-quality 
deal flow from a trusted source, coupled with the investor‘s own 
expertise, is highly reminiscent of pre-Internet angel prac-
tice.120 
AngelList filters its investments differently. Rather than 
prescreen startups that can list on the site, AngelList has a 
 
ticated investors who take an active monitoring approach to relatively unso-
phisticated and passive investors.‖). 
 117. Matthew Zeitlin, FundersClub Takes Crowdsourcing Approach to Ear-
ly-Stage Venture Capital, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 3, 2013, 5:45 AM), http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/03/fundersclub-takes-crowdsourcing 
-approach-to-early-stage-venture-capital.html (―[A]n investing committee for 
the company screens startups that could be hosted on the platform. Fun-
dersClub then hosts a few at a time . . . .‖). 
 118. Baverman, supra note 88 (―FundersClub acts like a traditional ven-
ture capital fund in some ways, screening thousands of start-ups and funding 
1.8% of applicants.‖). CircleUp accepts less than two percent of companies hop-
ing to be listed on its website. Ryan Caldbeck, Why We Are Picky: The Im-
portance of Curation in Crowdfunding, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2012/11/20/why-we-are-picky-the 
-importance-of-curation-in-crowdfunding; cf. William Alden, Crowdfunding 
Site CircleUp Raises $14 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:31 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/crowdfunding-site-circleup-raises-14 
-million (―CircleUp offers investors equity in small consumer and retail com-
panies, which are vetted to weed out potential duds.‖). 
 119. Zeitlin, supra note 117 (―FundersClub so far has hosted only compa-
nies that have come out of the startup accelerators 500 Startups and Y Com-
binator (FundersClub itself is a Y Combinator alumnus).‖).  
 120. See Caldbeck, supra note 118; How FundersClub Selects Companies, 
FUNDERSCLUB.COM, https://fundersclub.com/vetting (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) 
(describing a process that closely resembles a traditional VC or angel screen-
ing process). MicroVentures follows a similar process, and claims they review 
potential listings with the ―same level of rigor as traditional Venture Capital 
companies.‖ Investors, MICROVENTURES.COM, https://microventures.com/  
investors (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). EarlyShares also conducts due diligence 
to decide whether a startup should be listed on its site. Frequently Asked 
Questions, EARLYSHARES.COM, http://www.earlyshares.com/learn-more/how-it 
-works/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
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more open listing policy. However, investors still receive sig-
nals of startup quality through the concept of ―social proof.‖121 
Social proof works by showing new investors which startups 
other investors, including prominent investors, are funding. As 
one former AngelList investor writes, ―Nearly every email [An-
gelList] send[s] includes names of people or firms who‘ve com-
mitted to invest.‖122 Top angels, by followers, on AngelList are 
household names: Reid Hoffman (founder of LinkedIn), Marissa 
Mayer (CEO of Yahoo), and the actor Ashton Kutcher.123 In 
mid-May 2013, Hoffman ―was the most tracked investor on An-
gelList with 21,558 followers.‖124 AngelList makes it possible 
for new passive angels to piggyback on Hoffman‘s (and others‘) 
expertise when selecting which startups to fund.125 Indeed, An-
gelList has a function called ―syndicate,‖ which operates in ex-
actly the same way as a traditional angel syndicate, except 
online.126 New investors are passive and turn over decision-
making to an active angel. 
The preceding examples show that, on the ex ante side, 
traditional screening mechanisms of expert angels and means 
of obtaining high-quality deal flow are alive and well on the In-
ternet under Title II. What about ex post investment, where 
routine participation in a venture‘s development reduces the 
angel‘s agency costs? This does not seem possible given the ge-
ographic dispersion of investors over the Internet.  
On closer examination, however, the most successful Title 
II sites seek to screen not only startups, but also investors, 
making sure to attract those investors who can contribute val-
ue-added services. FundersClub is an invitation-only site on the 
investor side too.127 FundersClub is wary of the ―potential for 
equity crowdfunders to only provide . . . . ‗dumb money‘‖ with-
 
 121. Why I Deleted My AngelList Account, BRYCE DOT VC, http://bryce 
.vc/post/3520840379/why-i-deleted-my-angellist-account (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015) (discussing AngelList‘s use of ―social proof‖). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Davidson, supra note 85.  
 124. Id. 
 125. WeFunder uses something similar called the ―haystack.‖ The haystack 
is ―a tool that allows [investors] to quickly flip through new companies and 
rate them.‖ Common Questions, WEFUNDER.COM, https://wefunder.com/faq/ 
common_questions (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Once a startup‘s profile earns a 
positive rating, it is promoted out of the haystack and onto WeFunder‘s ―Top 
Startups‖ page. Id. 
 126. Stone, supra note 81 (―[S]yndicates lets users pool their money along-
side a single well-connected angel.‖). 
 127. Constine, supra note 87.  
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out value-added services.128 Similarly, AngelList ―only allows 
accredited investors who can help a startup in tangible ways, 
not just those who provide capital.‖129 Despite these state-
ments, it is difficult to believe that, with the expanded reach of 
Title II, there are not plenty of investors on Title II sites who do 
not contribute value-added services. That should not be a prob-
lem so long as there are active angels who do provide these ser-
vices, with new investors in a passive role. The leading inves-
tors on AngelList and FundersClub are likely closely 
monitoring their startups post-investment.130 Further, the ease 
of adding passive angels who do not contribute value-added 
services is one of the benefits of Title II, as explained below. 
2. Title II Sites Reduce Transaction Costs and Add Passive  
Angels at Low Cost 
If Title II sites are the functional equivalent of traditional 
entrepreneurial finance, why not just stick with traditional en-
trepreneurial finance? Why would angels or VCs use the Inter-
net? My answer is twofold: (1) the Internet reduces the transac-
tion costs of angel/VC operations; and (2) the Internet is a 
cheap way to add new, passive angels to existing networks. 
First, I argue that the Internet is beneficial to angels and 
VCs because it reduces the transaction costs of their opera-
tions. That the Internet can reduce the transaction costs of 
group organization is nothing new.131 ―Cyberlaw theorists have 
pointed to network effects and lower transaction costs as con-
tributing factors for increased online production.‖132 Another 
 
 128. Id. Indeed, as FundersClub‘s co-founder notes: ―We‘re not trying to 
democratize access to start-up investing . . . . We‘re trying to democratize ac-
cess to investing in the highest-promise start-ups.‖ Baverman, supra note 88. 
 129. Tomio Geron, The Most Influential Angel Investors on AngelList, 
FORBES (May 1, 2012, 3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/ 
2012/05/01/the-most-influential-angel-investors-on-angellist.  
 130. Unfortunately I have no evidence at this early stage in the life of Title 
II of the extent to which investors are interacting with entrepreneurs post-
investment. 
 131. See Nathaniel J. Gleicher, Moneybombs and Democratic Participation: 
Regulating Fundraising by Online Intermediaries, 70 MD. L. REV. 750, 766 
(2011) (―Online organizations radically reduce [transaction] costs by using e-
mail instead of traditional mail and by relying on the Internet to connect with 
and organize their members.‖). See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVE-
RYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (dis-
cussing the ways in which groups have effectively used the Internet to organ-
ize). 
 132. Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and 
User Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 900 (2011) (citing YOCHAI 
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commentator observed that ―the Internet is a perfect medium 
for eliminating the middleman and transaction costs stemming 
from organizational structure.‖133 For example, Title II sites 
are attempting to make the process of investing more like one-
click shopping on Amazon.134 Angel investors easily sharing 
best practices online is another example of the Internet reduc-
ing transaction costs.135  
Second, angels and VCs are using Title II to attract more 
sources of funding at a low cost. More investors tagging along 
to Reid Hoffman‘s investments simply allows Hoffman to fund 
more, and larger, startups. His transaction costs of finding this 
new money are extremely low. As one commentator put it: ―An-
gelList has done for deal flow what Facebook did for keeping up 
with your friends. The site has transformed deal flow from an 
activity requiring active intention into one where you can sit 
back and let the cash come to you.‖136 Further, the money 
comes with no strings, as the anonymity and geographic spread 
of the Internet allows Hoffman to advise and monitor the 
startup without co-investor interference. 
Here we return again to ACE-Net (and not for the last 
time). One important reason that ACE-Net failed was that it 
did not replicate offline angel operations. There was no screen-
ing of startups prior to listing on ACE-Net or ―social proof‖ type 
concepts after listing. ACE-Net was a completely hands-off in-
termediary.137 We shall see that other than its accredited-
 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANS-
FORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 3–5 (2006)). 
 133. Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit Or-
ganizations in the Commons Communities, 50 JURIMETRICS 275, 324 (2010). 
 134. What is AngelList?, THE SECRET OF RAISING MONEY (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://blog.thesecretofraisingmoney.com/whatisangellist (AngelList uses Invest 
Online, where ―funding is now just a couple clicks away‖ and which is ―akin 
[to] shopping on Amazon‖); cf. Colleen Taylor, Backed with $1.5M, CircleUp 
Aims To Be the AngelList for Consumer and Retail Startups, TECHCRUNCH 
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/18/circleup (―CircleUp also 
serves as a broker-dealer to allow the funding transactions to take place via 
the site.‖).  
 135. Best Practices for Angel Investors and Entrepreneurs, ANGELBLOG, 
http://www.angelblog.net (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (―Angel investing will get 
to the same state of development [as VCs] even faster because we can now ex-
change and develop ideas on the internet.‖). 
 136. Evan Burfield, The Changing Nature of Angel Investing, 1776 (May 
16, 2014), http://www.1776.vc/insights/the-changing-nature-of-angel-investing. 
 137. Acs & Tarpley, supra note 110, at 796 (describing the myriad of re-
strictions on ACE-Net‘s involvement with companies and transactions im-
posed by the SEC No-Action letter that based ACE-Net possible before JOBS 
Act Title II). 
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investor-only limitation, ACE-Net more closely resembles a Ti-
tle III site than a Title II site. Why it was not successful as a 
Title III-type site is an important part of the next Part‘s discus-
sion. 
IV.  TITLE III AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A LEMONS 
PROBLEM?   
The previous Part argued that Title II sites are not equity 
crowdfunding at all, but traditional networks of angels and VCs 
operating online to reduce transaction costs and add passive 
investors at a low cost. As such, they are virtually the same 
markets as have traditionally existed, and therefore history 
shows they are not lemons markets. 
Title III, on the other hand, is a paradigm shift. This is not 
simply moving a current network online, but creating a new 
one altogether. This is because: (1) Title III is more than mov-
ing existing networks online; unaccredited investors are not 
part of existing angel/VC networks, and thus their inclusion 
would form new networks of players unknown to each other; (2) 
given the sheer number of unaccredited versus accredited in-
vestors, this would more closely resemble a non-expert based 
―wisdom of the crowds‖ situation than piggybacking on expert 
investors;138 and (3) given the foregoing, the identity and quali-
ty of the entrepreneurs, investors, and matchmaking sites un-
der Title III might be different. 
A. TITLE III AS A VIABLE MARKET? 
From the outset, it must be emphasized that what follows 
are my predictions for Title III, which are, at this point, an ed-
ucated guess since it has not yet been implemented. Twelve 
states have evidently tired of waiting for the SEC to act on Ti-
tle III and have implemented their own intrastate Title III-like 
exemptions.139 However, my preliminary review of those ex-
 
 138. Crowdfunding also by its nature implies a significant number of inves-
tors each contributing small sums of capital. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & 
Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011) (―[T]he idea of crowdfunding 
is to obtain [funds] from a large audience (the ‗crowd‘), where each individual 
will provide a very small amount.‖). 
 139. These states are: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. N. 
AM. SEC. ADMINISTRATORS ASS‘N, (Aug. 1, 2015), http://nasaa.cdn.s3 
.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NASAA-Crowdfunding-Index_8 
-1-2015a1.pdf. 
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emptions finds that they have not been used much, and, there-
fore, are unlikely to inform us about how the federal exemption 
will play.140 
There are two important and interrelated questions that 
must be answered to determine Title III‘s viability. First, what 
subset of entrepreneurs will Title III attract? Is it only the lem-
ons—the low-quality entrepreneurs who cannot receive funding 
through traditional sources or Title II? Or can Title III also at-
tract high-quality startups? Second, and relatedly, will infor-
mation asymmetry problems be so great under Title III that on 
the investor side, dumb money floods the market and skews 
valuations? Should this happen, high-quality startups will be 
indistinguishable from poor ones, resulting in high-quality 
startups exiting Title III, leaving only the lemons behind. 
1. What Subset of Startups Would Choose Title III? 
Will high-quality startups elect to use Title III to raise 
funds once it is implemented? Potential problems jump off the 
page. Selling to unaccredited investors involves considerably 
more risk than selling to accredited investors, even under re-
laxed rules. Unsophisticated investors are unlikely to appreci-
ate the significant risk of losing their entire investment in a 
startup that fails (as most startups do). Compare this with an-
gels and VCs, who understand that most startups fail and 
therefore diversify for protection.141 How is an unaccredited in-
vestor supposed to adequately diversify with a relatively small 
cap on annual Title III investing?  
Piling on, unaccredited investors are more likely to sue if 
things go bad.142 Receiving small sums from a multitude of in-
 
 140. For example, Georgia has the ―Invest Georgia Exemption‖ program, 
which was adopted in November 2011. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08 
(2014). This exemption allows businesses to raise up to $1 million and non-
accredited investors can invest up to $10,000. Id. Nevertheless, only six com-
panies had taken advantage of the exemption as of mid-2013. Patrick Clark, 
Kansas and Georgia Beat the SEC on Crowdfunding Rules. Now Others Are 
Trying, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/  
articles/2013-06-20/kansas-and-georgia-beat-the-sec-on-crowdfunding-rules 
-dot-now-others-are-trying. 
 141. See Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1424 n.91 (citing a prior study support-
ing the proposition that angels diversify by investing in multiple startups); D. 
Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL 
& EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 142 (1998) (―[T]he venture capitalist has a diversi-
fied portfolio of opportunities . . . .‖ (quoting Christopher B. Barry, New Direc-
tions in Research on Venture Capital Finance, 23 FIN. MGMT. 3, 7–8 (1994))). 
 142. Absent fraud, the potential for suits in the crowdfunding context is 
uncertain at best, however. Consider fiduciary duty suits, a classic means of 
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vestors complicates a young startup‘s capital structure, which 
can create administrative problems143 and scare away follow-on 
financing from angels and VCs.144 Given that Title II platforms 
are proving successful and attracting well-known angels and 
VCs, who can offer cash and value-added services, wouldn‘t a 
rational entrepreneur seek out those investors over the general 
public, who can provide only money?145  
These problems are real, but despite them, there are two 
types of high-quality startups that might elect to use Title III to 
raise funds. First, Title III should appeal to high-quality 
startups that are too young for ―professional‖ financing under 
Title II or traditional methods. In short, these startups are too 
early stage for even a $100,000 angel investment to be on the 
table. Instead, they might seek only $20,000 to develop a proto-
type, hire a lawyer to incorporate, or obtain a patent.146 Instead 
of bootstrapping with credit cards or hitting up the entrepre-
neur‘s parents, these startups might look to Title III. 
Second, even for high-quality startups that have pro-
gressed a bit further, Title III would appeal to that subset of 
startups that need cash but do not need value-added services 
from investors. I have previously argued that some cash-
efficient startups—which are good prospects for Title III sites 
 
trying to reduce agency costs for shareholders. First, a shareholder or plain-
tiff‘s lawyer (depending on whether a suit is direct or derivative) would need to 
be sufficiently incentivized to bring suit. This is unlikely for crowdfunded 
startups where small individual and even aggregate investments are at stake. 
Second, even if suit was brought, most startups fail due to the technology not 
working as expected, another competitor being first to market, inability to ob-
tain funding needed for development, or other reasons that would implicate a 
director‘s duty of care. As Steven Bradford correctly observes, ―Even in the ab-
sence of fraud or self-dealing, many crowdfunded small businesses will fail.‖ 
Bradford, supra note 10, at 108; see also STROSS, supra note 86, at 14 (quoting 
Paul Graham as stating, ―If you start a startup, you‘ll probably fail. Most 
startups fail. It‘s the nature of the business‖). Duty of care claims are well 
known to be losers in most instances.  
 143. See John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act‟s Strange Bedfellows: De-
mocracy and Start-Up Company Investing, 62 KAN. L. REV. 357, 368 (2013) 
(―[T]he rule of thumb [that startups have fewer investors] often makes good 
business sense for start-up companies because, among other reasons, manag-
ing relationships with fewer investors involves lower transaction costs.‖). 
 144. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1428–31 (arguing that angels do not over-
complicate their investments so the startups are more attractive for VCs down 
the road). 
 145. See Palmiter, supra note 12, at 389 (―[C]rowdfunding under the JOBS 
Act could fizzle or bomb.‖). 
 146. It might seem that more funding is always better, but this is not the 
case. The earlier stage a startup is in, the lower its valuation and thus the 
more equity it must give away for a given amount of funding. 
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given its annual $1 million cap on fundraising147—should avoid 
VCs and stick to angel investors.148 This is because the VC‘s 
value-added services are not necessary, and therefore VC cash 
is not worth the complications that come with it.149  
Title III startups would take the argument one step further 
and forego (or delay) angel value-added services as well. A 
strong entrepreneurial team might be able to guide a cash-
efficient startup from launch to a quick sale without much pro-
fessional help. For cash-efficient startups, equity crowdfunding 
under Title III offers a low-cost and readily available source of 
capital while keeping decision-making fully in the hands of the 
entrepreneur. Compare that with Title II, where the active in-
vestors are still presumably hands-on, as in traditional entre-
preneurial finance.150 In short, the inherent passivity of Title 
III investors—a seeming negative—would actually appeal to 
entrepreneurs who wish to unbundle the cash and value-added 
service components of traditional entrepreneurial finance.151 In 
obtaining only cash from investors, these startups could also 
obtain a better price for their shares, as there would be no in-
herent premium in the share price for value-added services.152  
If Title III sites attract high-quality startups under the cir-
cumstances envisioned above, it follows that high-quality inves-
tors will visit Title III sites to find them. If Title III investors 
are predominantly the general public, then sophisticated angels 
and VCs would enjoy an informational advantage over these 
investors. They could exploit that informational advantage in a 
kind of arbitrage, hopping into Title III and picking off good 
startups on the cheap.153 In short, Title III‘s inefficiencies could 
 
 147. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
 148. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 99. 
 149. Id. at 259–65. 
 150. See supra notes 113–28 and accompanying text. 
 151. Although it is generally assumed that entrepreneurs benefit from VC 
and angel value-added services, this is not a uniformly held view. See Smith, 
supra note 141, at 134–35 (examining the risks entrepreneurs face when they 
seek value-added services from VCs); cf. Bradford, supra note 10, at 104 (not-
ing that crowdfunded startups will not receive angels‘ and VCs‘ value-added 
services, but arguing that ―crowdfunding is not a substitute for venture capital 
or angel investing; it is aimed at entrepreneurs who do not have access to such 
funding‖).  
 152. Fisch, supra note 10, at 84 (―Although it is difficult to quantify the 
value of management, monitoring and consulting services, the small business‘ 
cost of capital should include a component of payment for these services in ad-
dition to the cost of capital funds.‖). 
 153. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 789 (1985) (―If 
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be exploited by those in the know, which would make it worth-
while for them to invest there.154  
2. Avoiding the Lemons Problem: Title III and Information  
Asymmetry 
If a segment of high-quality entrepreneurs and investors 
would be inclined to use Title III, the related question is 
whether information asymmetry problems will be so great that 
dumb money floods the market and skews valuations in such a 
way that the good startups cannot distinguish themselves from 
bad ones. 
This is a classic ―market for lemons‖ problem. As Zohor 
Golshen and Gideon Parchomsvsky succinctly describe it:  
A ―lemons market‖ is a market in which asymmetric information ex-
ists between sellers and buyers. Since the buyers are not fully in-
formed as to the quality of the products, they discount the price of all 
products. High quality products will not sell for a price that reflects 
their quality and will, thus, exit the market. Only ―lemons‖ are left in 
the market.155 
While it is all an educated guess at this point, Title III is 
unlikely to replace traditional entrepreneurial finance or Title 
II. Startups have historically preferred to use Rule 506 to raise 
funds from accredited investors only, and there is unlikely to be 
 
she assumes that the market is inefficient, she would expect to earn extra 
profits (though she may fail to do so), and thus would acquire the information. 
If she believed that the market was efficient, however, she would recognize 
that she could not profit from acquiring the information, and therefore would 
lack any incentive to acquire costly information.‖); see also Lynn A. Stout, The 
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pric-
ing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 618 (1988) (explaining 
the weak connection between the stock market and the allocation of real re-
sources). 
 154. It could be argued that this pattern would lead to an unsustainable 
result. As Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman write:  
Traders would initially acquire information because, in an inefficient 
market, they could earn returns on their investment in acquisition. 
As more traders became initially informed, however, the price system 
would convey more information to uninformed traders, thereby lower-
ing the returns to informed traders. At the point at which the market 
became fully efficient, there would be no return to informed traders 
for having acquired the information, and, as a result, information ac-
quisition would cease. The market would sink into informational inef-
ficiency once more, only to repeat the cycle as soon as some traders 
again found information acquisition profitable. 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficien-
cy, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 577–78 (1985). I am, however, skeptical that Title III 
markets would come to this. 
 155. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securi-
ties Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 762 n.192 (2006).  
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a sea change toward seeking out unaccredited investors.156 Fur-
ther, most startups probably still need both an investor‘s cash 
and value-added services. Still, Title III will have an important 
role to play for very early-stage or niche startups. 
a. The Importance of Unaccredited Investors Under Title III 
Dumb money is a danger to Title III‘s viability. In tradi-
tional entrepreneurial finance and under Title II, smart money 
sets a startup valuation. Under Title III, however, if most mon-
ey is dumb money that is randomly distributed (i.e., not fun-
neled to the best startups), then valuations will be skewed. Ex-
acerbating this concern is that high-quality investors cannot 
move pricing by investing significant sums, as in public mar-
kets, since all investors are capped in annual investment 
amounts.157 Even without these investment caps, I have argued 
that part of the Internet‘s attraction for accredited investors is 
the ability to add tag-along passive investors at a low cost. In 
other words, accredited investors want unaccredited investors 
to follow them into startups.  
Therefore, if unaccredited investors will mostly populate 
Title III, and if their money needs to be funneled to good 
startups, it follows that Title III‘s viability depends on solving 
the information asymmetry problem for unaccredited investors. 
Consequently, the remainder of my discussion focuses on ways 
of reducing information asymmetry for unaccredited investors 
under Title III. 
b. Reducing Information Asymmetry for Unaccredited  
Investors 
I have already discussed the massive information asym-
metry that exists in startup investing generally and how angels 
and VCs manage the problem.158 To recap, VCs reduce the en-
trepreneur‘s informational advantage through staged financing 
and other signals of startup quality,159 while angels learn of 
 
 156. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.  
 157. It is true that accredited investors can invest more than unaccredited 
investors under these caps, but it is doubtful it will be enough to overcome the 
likely greater supply of unaccredited investor money from more unaccredited 
participants. 
 158. See supra notes 55–78 and accompanying text. 
 159. These include following high-quality angels and other VCs into deals 
and using preferred stock versus the entrepreneur‘s common stock. Jeffrey 
Trester, Venture Capital Contracting Under Asymmetric Information 5–6 
(Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr. Working Paper No. 94-06, Oct. 1993), http://fic 
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promising entrepreneurs from networks of trust and bring their 
own expertise to bear on familiar technologies.160 Title II im-
ports the traditional angel screening mechanisms to the Inter-
net.161 Therefore, in traditional entrepreneurial finance and 
under Title II, high-quality entrepreneurs can distinguish 
themselves from low-quality entrepreneurs, and thus we do not 
have a market for lemons. 
The question is whether the same can be predicted for Title 
III. With the paradigm shift that is Title III, networks of trust 
do not exist. Instead, the majority of players will likely be un-
known to each other. Therefore, we must look for other ways to 
reduce information asymmetry for investors and avoid the lem-
ons problem.162 Three possible ways are (i) disclosure; (ii) the 
wisdom of crowds; and (iii) the use of reputational intermediar-
ies. These three alternatives are now discussed in turn.  
i. Disclosure 
Securities regulation‘s mandatory-disclosure regime is a 
classic way of evening the informational playing field between 
issuers and investors. As the Supreme Court stated in the fa-
mous case of Ralston Purina, the Securities Act of 1933 was in-
tended ―to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of in-
formation thought necessary to informed investment 
decisions.‖163 
Title III weakens the disclosure required in sales to unac-
credited investors. Under Title III, issuers must disclose items 
such as the nature of the startup, the names of the directors 
and a description of the issuer‘s ownership and capital struc-
ture, a description of the current business, the anticipated 
business plan, a description of the stated purpose and intended 
use of the proceeds of the offering sought by the issuer, the tar-
get amount of funding sought from the offering, and the issuer‘s 
financial condition, which may include income tax filings and 
 
.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/ 94/9406.pdf. 
 160. See supra notes 65–78 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 79–145 and accompanying text.  
 162. Reducing Barriers to Capital Formation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov. Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 11–12 (2013) (statement of Donald C. Langevoort, 
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter) (urging the committee to consider ways to help investors tell the difference 
between good and bad actors based on the premise that any innovations made 
by the JOBS Act in capital-raising would not work without these safeguards). 
 163. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). 
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audited financial statements.164 These are more lenient re-
quirements than what was previously required under Rule 506, 
for example, which required unaccredited investors to receive 
significant financial and non-financial information. Depending 
on certain factors, this disclosure could be the ―same kind of in-
formation as [would be] required in Part I of a registration 
statement.‖165  
At least one prominent scholar, Thomas Hazen, has called 
for greater disclosure under Title III.166 Can mandatory disclo-
sure—either of to the extent required by Title III or enhanced, 
as Hazen calls for—solve the lemons problem? It is unlikely for 
several reasons, including: (1) financial and other illiteracy 
among unaccredited investors; (2) the inapplicability of the effi-
cient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) to crowdfunding; and 
(3) previous relevant experience in a European market, Ger-
many‘s Neuer Markt. 
First, mandatory disclosure is an imperfect fit for the type 
of investors that crowdfunding targets. Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Carl Schneider have taken a systematic look at why mandatory 
disclosure generally fails.167 They argue, on a foundational lev-
el, that familiarizing ourselves with disclosure is unpleasant. 
They write that, at its core, mandatory disclosure is ―an enor-
mous educational enterprise of a kind academics may enjoy but 
that most people do not.‖168 Further, unsophisticated people 
―often can‘t read‖ the disclosures, if reading means to ―extract 
useful meaning from them.‖169 The authors illuminate three 
broad categories of reading comprehension problems: ―illitera-
cy, innumeracy, and sector illiteracy.‖170 The latter two, and po-
tentially all three, would seem to apply in the crowdfunding 
context with nascent startups of a technical nature.171 This is 
 
 164. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2012). 
 165. 17 C.F.R. 230.502(b)(2)(A) (2014). 
 166. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 1767 (arguing that disclosures ―could be 
less burdensome than those currently required under Regulation A, but they 
should still be sufficiently detailed to provide investors with sufficient infor-
mation to enable them to make an informed investment decision‖). 
 167. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
 168. Id. at 56. 
 169. Id. at 79.  
 170. Id. at 91. 
 171. Bradford, supra note 10, at 109–10 (giving statistics and noting that 
―[m]any American are not financially literate‖); id. at 112 (―Since crowdfund-
ing sites are usually open to the general public, at least some of the people in-
vesting in crowdfunding offerings will not have the basic financial knowledge 
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assuming potential investors even attempt to read the disclo-
sures, which is questionable at best.172 
Second, while these problems also exist in public markets, 
public markets rely at least in part on the ECMH to remedy 
them. Under the ECMH, succinctly put, sophisticated investors 
move market prices by absorbing disclosures and trading in 
significant volumes on that information.173 Unsophisticated in-
vestors then rely on the adjusted stock price as a good proxy for 
new information about the company.174 While there are certain-
ly well-known criticisms and shortcomings of the ECMH, it is 
still at least a crude mechanism that makes disclosure work for 
unsophisticated investors in the public markets context. Title 
III crowdfunding sites would not be efficient markets, so the 
ECMH cannot benefit its unsophisticated participants. As men-
tioned, accredited investor annual caps under Title III exacer-
bate the problem by not allowing smart money to adequately 
―price up‖ good startups (or ―price down‖ bad ones). 
Third, previous experience with a significant disclosure re-
gime for growth companies is instructive. Because the rest of 
the world does not have the sophisticated network of private 
angels and VCs found in the U.S., efforts have been made to es-
 
required to understand the risks.‖); Fisch, supra note 10, at 78 (―Small busi-
nesses generally have difficulty raising capital because of informational 
asymmetries and the inability of investors to judge the quality of the offering. 
These deficiencies are not remedied by the type of information that can be 
posted on a Web site.‖). 
 172. Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Con-
veying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 
U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 932 (noting that the SEC originally ―objected to the dis-
semination of forward-looking statements, fearing that unsophisticated inves-
tors would rely too heavily on this type of speculative information‖). 
 173. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of 
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (introducing the theory 
of efficient capital markets). 
 174. A court describes this process: 
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor‘s reliance up-
on information is into the subjective pricing of that information by 
that investor. With the presence of a market, the market is interposed 
between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the 
investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is 
performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by 
the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the 
unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the infor-
mation available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market 
price. 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) (quoting In re LTV Securities 
Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). 
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tablish public markets for growth companies. One such effort at 
a junior stock exchange, the Neuer Markt in Germany, imposed 
significant regulatory restraints on companies that listed there, 
including strict disclosure rules.175 As John Coffee observes, the 
Neuer Markt‘s ―requirements were more rigorous than those 
specified either by its parent, the Deutsche Boerse, or, more 
surprisingly, by the SEC.‖176 Despite these strictures, ―the 
Neuer Markt became plagued by scandals and saw its market 
capitalization slide by 73% since the end of 1999,‖177 and was 
shut down in 2003.178 By contrast, another junior stock ex-
change for growth companies—London‘s Alternative Invest-
ment Market (AIM)—employs a ―light-touch‖ regulatory 
scheme (similar to Title III) and has been far more success-
ful.179  
To be clear, I am not arguing that Title III startups should 
not be subject to mandatory disclosure. Indeed, disclosure is a 
must for entrepreneurs to inform potential investors about 
their startups and the investment under consideration. What I 
am arguing, however, is that there are good reasons to believe 
that mandatory disclosure alone will not solve the lemons prob-
lem because unaccredited investors will not adequately benefit 
from mandatory disclosure under Title III.180 Therefore, we 
turn to a second option: the wisdom of crowds. 
ii. The Wisdom of the Crowd 
The second way that unaccredited investors may not suffer 
from information asymmetry is if assembling them over the In-
ternet produces a collective wisdom that would not otherwise 
exist. The concept of the ―crowd‖ under Title III is messy and 
 
 175. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-
Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Govern-
ance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1804 (2002) (―Intended as a market for high 
growth firms, the Neuer Markt adopted a unique style by advertising itself as 
the ‗most regulated market‘ in Europe.‖). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1805. 
 178. Coffee claims that ―the fate of Neuer Markt shows less the failure of 
heightened disclosure standards than the strength of the network externali-
ties that link firms traded on the same high profile market. Once some firms 
on the Neuer Markt became mired in scandals, the Neuer Markt‘s reputation 
became tarnished.‖ Id. However, my point is that heightened disclosure, with-
out more, was not sufficient to avoid a market failure in the Neuer Markt. 
 179. See infra notes 215–24 and accompanying text.  
 180. I have not even discussed the behavioral biases that may plague un-
sophisticated investors, which would also cut against a predominantly disclo-
sure-based solution to the potential lemons problem in crowdfunding.  
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ambiguous. For example, Joan Heminway actually defines this 
hypothetical ―crowd‖ as an ―ill-defined group of potential and 
actual investors in securities offered and sold through crowd-
funding.‖181  
As Heminway notes: ―Crowds can be ‗mad‘—irrational, 
foolish, and even stupid. On the other hand, crowds can be 
‗wise‘—rational, sensible, and intelligent.‖182 She goes on to 
suggest that ―preliminarily indicat[ions are] that the crowd 
[under Title III] has the potential for wisdom.‖183 Using James 
Surowiecki‘s framework, Heminway notes that Title III crowds 
are likely to be heterogeneous, independent, and operate in a 
decentralized manner.184  
In more general terms, the idea is that crowds may be bet-
ter at spotting a diamond in the rough than experts. This is es-
pecially true where the crowds know something in particular 
about the product or technology. Consider a new video game 
that a certain group on the Internet is addicted to. This virtual 
crowd would better be able to predict this game‘s broader suc-
cess than an angel or VC who has never played the game (or its 
rivals). In these cases, the Title III crowds would fund the good 
game and not its rivals, thus resulting in correct pricing and no 
lemons market.  
Much like AngelList‘s concept of social proof, a knowledge-
able segment of the crowd would benefit the unknowledgeable 
rest of the lot—these investors could tag along to the knowl-
edgeable crowd‘s decisions. In one study, early investors in 
crowdfunded projects were found to have a significant influence 
on later investors.185 In particular, later investors (the ―crowd‖) 
were heavily influenced to invest when early investors were ei-
ther app developers or experienced investors.186 While the early 
 
 181. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the 
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829 
(2014). 
 182. Id. at 830 (citations omitted). 
 183. Id. at 845. However, Heminway also correctly notes that ―[s]ignificant 
empirical research is needed‖ to determine whether Title III crowds will be 
wise or not. Id. 
 184. Id. at 845–46; see also Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extrem-
ism and Social Learning, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 263, 267–70 (2009) (explaining 
that a homogenous group will lead to extremism, not wisdom). 
 185. Keongtae Kim & Siva Viswanathan, The Experts in the Crowd: The 
Role of Reputable Investors in a Crowdfunding Market 3 (Nov. 2013) (un-
published manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2258243). 
 186. Id. 
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investors in this study sound like experts, it stands to reason 
that a knowledgeable segment of the crowd could serve the 
same signaling function for later investors.187 
iii. Reputational Intermediaries 
Another potential solution to the lemons problem is the use 
of reputational intermediaries as a means of signaling startup 
quality. Signals are important in solving the lemons problem. 
In the classic used car example, dealers signal that their cars 
are not lemons by issuing a warranty.188 In securities markets, 
reputational intermediaries such as accountants and invest-
ment banks offer signals of quality for the companies they rep-
resent, thereby reducing information asymmetries for potential 
investors.189 As Bernard Black writes: ―The principal role of 
reputational intermediaries is to vouch for disclosure quality 
and thereby reduce information asymmetry in securities mar-
kets.‖190 These repeat players‘ reputations are tied to the com-
panies they represent, and thus they have incentives to guard 
against the companies failing or committing fraud.191  
Signaling is not that important for the accredited investors 
 
 187. Id. at 7 (citing studies finding that social networks of early investors 
can influence later investors in non-equity based crowdfunding projects). 
 188. Akerlof, supra note 17, at 499–500; Brian JM Quinn, Putting Your 
Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance of Earnouts in Corporate Ac-
quisitions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 138 (2012) (―In the context of Akerlof‘s used 
cars, a seller might offer a warranty on the quality of the car as an example of 
a costly signal to demonstrate the seller‘s confidence in its unobservable quali-
ty.‖). 
 189. Langevoort, supra note 41, at 14 (―[I]nvestors are more likely to rely 
on the disclosures when a reputable intermediary is involved, and hence de-
mand less of a risk premium.‖); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O‘Hara, The 
Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J. 
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 297, 301 (2002). 
 190. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 788 (2001); see also Goshen 
& Parchomovsky, supra note 155, at 763 n.196 (explaining that public compa-
ny ―issuers attempt to avoid the ‗lemons market‘ by using underwriters, and 
underpricing the IPOs (sometimes heavily)‖); Langevoort, supra note 41, at 14 
(writing that much attention has been paid to the ―function that financial in-
termediaries play in signaling and bonding the informational credibility of is-
suer disclosure‖). 
 191. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 79 (―Investors may also view the absence 
of outside expert involvement in Internet offerings as a negative signal.‖) This 
theory of reputational constraints on bad behavior is not without its real-world 
exceptions, including Arthur Anderson‘s role in the fall of Enron. See JOHN C. 
COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
325–30 (2006) (discussing why reputational constraints failed to cause Arthur 
Andersen to more closely monitor Enron). 
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who know what they are looking for, or for knowledgeable seg-
ments of the crowd (think of the game-players described in the 
previous Section), but will be important for everyone else on Ti-
tle III. Even Title II relies on reputational intermediary-
signaling for its tag-along passive investors. Recall that heavy 
hitter angels and the ―social proof‖ function signal startup qual-
ity under Title II, and FundersClub‘s intensive screening pro-
cess signals startup quality for those who make it onto the 
FundersClub site. Who can serve as reputational intermediary 
under Title III?  
Again, a look overseas at a junior stock exchange for 
growth companies is instructive, but this time we examine the 
AIM. The AIM has been the most successful of all of the junior 
stock exchanges established worldwide.192 Unlike other ―feeder‖ 
exchanges to larger stock exchanges, it is not uncommon for 
companies to even migrate ―downward‖ from the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) to the AIM.193 While some of AIM‘s success is 
attributable to its heavy institutional-investor makeup,194 AIM 
has also been touted for its institutional structure for compa-
 
 192. See Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing 
Venues: The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 257, 284 (2008) (explaining that the LSE ―draws praise from inves-
tors, firms, and policy-makers alike, due to AIM‘s impressive results since 
2000.‖ (footnote omitted)). The AIM has been subject to ebbs and flows, and 
not all are convinced of its success. Robert Prentice notes ―AIM has been criti-
cized for being less than diligent in policing fraud among its listing compa-
nies.‖ Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of 
SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 755 (2007) (footnote omitted). He also ob-
serves that that there have been ―an accelerating number of delistings on AIM 
and most of its stock are not liquid.‖ Id. at 755–56; see also Steven M. Da-
vidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 137 (2007) 
(AIM shares are not actively traded). Still, compared to other junior exchanges 
worldwide, most point to AIM as having the most success. See generally Men-
doza, supra.  
 193. Michael Potter, Explaining the Continued Rise of London‘s Alterna-
tive Investment Market (May 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) http://  
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648835 (―[O]nly 111 companies 
have moved from the AIM to the LSE compared with 231 moving in the oppo-
site direction.‖); see also Mendoza, supra note 192, at 287 (―AIM is not merely 
a free-rider on London‘s and the LSE‘s reputation. Rather, AIM succeeds be-
cause it supplies a scarce product to the marketplace: rapid, low-cost access to 
public equity for small firms with high growth potential.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 194. Mendoza, supra note 192, at 297 (―[W]ealthy individuals with experi-
ence in securities trading, institutional investors, and entities specializing in 
AIM investments comprise most of AIM‘s investor base . . . .‖ (footnote omit-
ted)). But see id. (―The LSE does attract more retail investors to AIM by offer-
ing certain advantages, including tax breaks for individuals that invest in its 
low-tier market segment.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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nies, which consists of ―light-touch‖ regulation coupled with 
heavy reliance on Nominated Advisors, or Nomads, for each 
listed company.195 
Each company who wants to list on AIM must convince one 
of the forty-three authorized Nomads to vouch for it.196 ―Most 
nomads are investment banks or corporate finance firms.‖197 
The Nomad helps its companies establish and abide by good 
corporate governance procedures.198 Nomads must sign off on 
all non-routine announcements its company makes to the mar-
ket.199 Nomads act as private regulators for their companies, 
even signing off on security sales without direct approval from 
the AIM or LSE.200 The LSE considers the Nomad-company re-
lationship so important that if a company terminates its No-
mad, trading in the company‘s securities is suspended until it 
hires a new Nomad.201 The LSE website contains a more com-
plete description of the Nomad-company relationship, which 
reveals its depth and breadth.202 
 
 195. The AIM has a ―comply or explain‖ policy. Id. at 295 (―The genius of 
AIM‘s regulatory model lies with the comply-or-explain option provided to 
each listed company to adapt to the exchange‘s flexible and reduced set of 
rules.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 196. For a search tool companies can use to find Nomads, see Nomad 
Search Engine, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange 
.com/exchange/companies-and-advisors/aim/for-companies/nomad-search.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015).  
 197. Stéphane Rousseau, London Calling?: The Experience of the Alterna-
tive Investment Market and the Competitiveness of Canadian Stock Exchanges, 
23 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 51, 63 (2007); see also Mendoza, supra note 192, at 
316 n.323 (noting that, among qualifications, ―Nomad applicants must (i) have 
practiced corporate finance for a period of at least two years‖). 
 198. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., A GUIDE TO AIM 10 (Nigel Page ed., 2010), 
http://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/documents/LSEG_AIM_Guide 
.pdf (explaining that a Nomad will, ―[a]mong other things . . . ensure the direc-
tors are appropriate and capable of acting as a board for a company . . . [and 
the Nomad will] act as the primary regulator‖).  
 199. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR MAIN MAR-
KET AND AIM COMPANIES 94 (Nigel Page ed. 2012), http://www 
.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/publications/ 
documents/corpgov.pdf. 
 200. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., supra note 198. 
 201. See id. at 3. 
 202. Nomad offers a description of its advising:  
A Nomad is responsible for advising and guiding a company on its re-
sponsibilities in relation to its admission to AIM as well as its continu-
ing obligations once on market. To help fulfil [sic] this role, the Nomad 
will: 
*undertake extensive due diligence to ensure a company is suitable for 
AIM 
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If we envision startup problems that investors might be 
worried about as trifold—fraud, measurable qualities (e.g., good 
corporate governance practices), and viable business models—
the Nomad appears to tackle the first two. However, given the 
identity of the Nomads as corporate finance experts, it is doubt-
ful they do much to tackle the third problem of predicting a vi-
able business model. Nomads are not the equivalents of angels 
or VCs in technical know-how or experience; instead, they are 
advisors appropriate to help young companies with no prior ex-
perience being listed on a securities exchange. As such, No-
mads can be held liable to the LSE for ―improper reporting by 
their supervised companies‖ and [are] subject to ―investor law-
suits if investors are misled,‖203 but it does not appear that 
Nomads are liable for a sponsored company‘s business failure 
absent fraud. 
Given the close relationship between a Nomad and its 
listed companies, the Nomad serves as a classic reputational 
intermediary. As described by one commentator, ―[t]he Nomad‘s 
role is central to AIM‘s regulatory model, as these entities act 
as gatekeepers, advisers, and regulators of AIM-listed compa-
nies.‖204 He goes on to observe that ―AIM can be considered a 
„reputational market,‟ in which investors rely on the standing of 
Nomads as a proxy for the quality of listed companies.‖205 An-
other commentator contends that the ―signal that investors de-
rive from a company‘s being qualified as suitable for AIM rests 
 
*provide guidance throughout the flotation process 
*prepare the company for being on a public market 
*help prepare the AIM admission document 
*confirm appropriateness of the company to the Exchange 
*act as the primary regulator throughout a company‘s time on AIM. 
Choosing Your Advisor, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www 
.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/for-companies/ 
choosing/advisor.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 203. Mendoza, supra note 192, at 318; see also LONDON STOCK EXCH., su-
pra note 199, at 96 (explaining that the LSE can impose penalties on Nomads 
ranging from a monetary fine to a formal censure to a suspension); Rousseau, 
supra note 197, at 98–99 (explaining the potential civil liability for Nomads); 
Siobhan Kennedy, LSE Hits Nabarro Wells with £250,000 Fine over AIM 
Checks, TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/ 
business/industries/banking/article2155593.ece (reporting that the London 
Stock Exchange fined Nomad Nabarro Wells £250,000 for failings of ―due skill 
and care‖ expected of a Nomad). 
 204. Mendoza, supra note 192, at 295; see also Rousseau, supra note 197, at 
62 (―The nomad is the hallmark of the AIM.‖). 
 205. Mendoza, supra note 192 at 295–96 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
316 (―Without doubt, the comprehensive role of the Nominated Adviser is the 
strongest pillar of AIM‘s regulatory model.‖). 
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indirectly on their assessment of the nomad‘s reputation,‖206 
and that ―the reputation of a [N]omad is its most valuable as-
set.‖207 
The most obvious equivalent to the Nomad under Title III 
is the title‘s creation of ―funding portals.‖208 A funding portal is 
an ―Internet site that lists crowdfunding opportunities and pro-
vides a matching service for interested investors.‖209 In short, it 
would be the Title III equivalent to FundersClub or CircleUp. 
As a mandated FundersClub or CircleUp, the funding por-
tal is the right idea for avoiding the lemons problem, but it is 
poorly executed under Title III. Funding portals are currently 
envisioned as passive entities, for the most part, and ―limited to 
putting buyers and sellers together.‖210 The funding portal‘s 
role is directed at investors, including to ―ensure that investors 
review [startup] disclosures, answer various questions, and af-
firm they understand the risk of loss.‖211 Further, it is tasked 
with ensuring investors do not exceed their investment caps.212 
My suspicion is that this is fitting with the traditional practice 
of the government delegating gatekeeping tasks to private par-
ties.213 
Consequently, it is clear that the funding portal‘s primary 
relationship is not with the startup at all. Contrast that with 
the very different situation on the AIM, where the Nomads pri-
mary relationship is with the company, not investors. What is 
needed is a funding portal that is more like a Nomad, or a Fun-
dersClub—a third party that can engage with startups, screen 
out the bad apples, and therefore signal something about the 
 
 206. Rousseau, supra note 197, at 94. 
 207. Id. at 97. 
 208. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2014). See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, The 
New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND 
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 177, 178 (2013) (―This paper focuses on a new, 
statutorily ordained and mandated intermediary in certain securities offerings 
made through the Internet.‖). 
 209. Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good 
Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2012). The funding portal 
was a late entry into the JOBS Act, spurred on by fears of fraud. Id. 
 210. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1462 n.25 (listing five restrictions on fund-
ing portal activity that reveal the ACE-Net like passive role of the new fund-
ing portals). 
 211. Hazen, supra note 13, at 1756 (footnote omitted). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 
1636 (2010) (―Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, gatekeepers face poten-
tial civil liability for material misstatements or omissions in the registration 
statements of their clients.‖). 
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quality of startups that make it on to the site.  
What we currently have, however, is a funding portal that 
acts almost exactly as ACE-Net did over a decade ago. ACE-
Net, too, was a passive entity limited to putting buyers and 
sellers together.214 It could not handle financing transactions, 
screen startups, or anything else that required an active role.215 
This was in part to avoid being classified as an exchange or 
broker-dealer under the securities laws as they existed at the 
time.216 Yet ACE-Net was a disaster. And the inability of ACE-
Net to signal anything about the companies it listed is a large 
reason why it failed, if the AIM is any indication.  
B. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO TITLE III: MAKE FUNDING PORTALS  
THE EQUIVALENT OF AIM‘S NOMADS 
While the wisdom of the crowds may help to solve the lem-
ons problem under Title III, there are no legal changes that are 
needed to facilitate it. However, if we want intermediation as 
well, we must re-craft the concept of a ―funding portal‖ under 
Title III. 
London‘s success with the AIM, whose regulatory structure 
is driven by the company-Nomad relationship, is highly in-
structive for making Title III work on the reputational inter-
mediary front. I contend that Title III should be amended to 
change funding portals to make them work like Nomads. The 
overarching change needed in Title III is to make the funding 
portal‘s primary relationship be with startups, not investors. 
The following discussion addresses certain legislative changes 
that are needed to accomplish that objective.  
First, Title III should be amended to remove all provisions 
attempting to detach funding portals and the companies they 
list. For example, under Title III as currently written, a fund-
ing portal must basically act as a ―neutral third party‖217—an 
ACE-Net-like restriction. Consequently, it is not even clear if a 
funding portal could host an online discussion among investors 
 
 214. See Langevoort, supra note 41, at 8 (observing that with ACE-Net 
there is ―the disappearance of the securities professional (i.e., broker-dealer or 
investment advisor) as an intermediary . . . [which cannot] offer any invest-
ment advice or guidance‖). 
 215. See Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, supra 
note 108 ¶ 77,516. 
 216. See id. Conversely, the JOBS Act specifically excludes funding portals 
as broker-dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(h)(1) (2012). 
 217. See Jacques F. Baritot, Increasing Protection for Crowdfunding Inves-
tors Under the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259, 277 (2013). 
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about the quality of its listed startups that could help investors 
choose their investments.218 While companies pay Nomads to 
assess their suitability for the AIM and to serve as a Nomad af-
ter listing,219 it is unclear what compensation funding portals 
could receive from startups.220 To follow AIM‘s example, 
startups should be allowed to pay funding portals for their ser-
vices pre-and post-listing to help attract high quality portals.  
Second—the flip side of the coin—Title III‘s attempts to 
make the primary relationship between funding portal and in-
vestor should be rethought. The AIM experience had nothing of 
the sort, so we have no indication that an intermediary-
investor relationship would be beneficial. Further, Title III‘s 
current requirements impose significant costs on funding por-
tals.221 Funding portals‘ time would be better spent checking 
and vouching for startups, after which funding portal-approval 
could serve as a signal of startup quality. To entice high-quality 
entities to act as funding portals, we should keep costs low and 
directed to where they really matter. Importantly, I am not 
claiming that Title III‘s investor education and funding-limit 
checks are unimportant—I put that question aside without fur-
ther research.222 I am only arguing that the model we have to 
learn from—the AIM—suggests funding portals should be tied 
to startups, not investors. 
Third, furthering the idea of making funding portals re-
 
 218. See id. (noting that the neutrality rule could prevent message boards, 
forums, and the like where investors could rate and share their experiences 
with particular startups). 
 219. See Rousseau, supra note 197, at 96 (―Under the current model, issu-
ers pay nomads to assess whether they are suitable for AIM. They are paid by 
companies subsequently to admission to act as their sherpa.‖). 
 220. See Heminway, supra note 181, at 196–97 (critiquing the strict re-
strictions on funding portals meant to avoid potential conflicts of interest and 
observing that brokers are not subject to the same restrictions); see also Ste-
phen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 274 (2003) (―Some-
one has to pay for intermediary services, and eliminating conflicts may block 
an important source of financing.‖). 
 221. See Heminway, supra note 208, at 197 (explaining Congress ―may 
have crippled the small business financing tool it sought to create in the 
CROWDFUND Act by pricing funding portals out of the market‖); see also id. 
at 191 (―The CROWDFUND Act adds significant, mandatory burdens (and, as 
a result, costs) to this organically grown model—so many burdens, that it may 
be difficult for would-be funding portals to develop a profitable business mod-
el.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 222. See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 12, at 399–401 (discussing favorably 
Title III‘s investor education requirements and citing other scholars who 
agree). 
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sponsible for their startups, Title III currently only requires 
funding portals to do one type of due diligence on the compa-
nies that wish to list with them: background checks.223 Recall 
that AIM does not allow companies to even list without a No-
mad vouching for them, and FundersClub and CircleUp screen 
all their potential listings. These screening procedures involve 
far more diligence than a background check. Currently, Title 
III investors would receive no signal about a startup‘s quality 
from the fact that it passed a mere background check before be-
ing listed on a funding portal site. 
Further, post-listing, Nomads are subject to potential lia-
bility from the LSE and investors for their sponsored compa-
nies‘ fraud. The JOBS Act clarifies that state securities com-
missions have enforcement authority over funding portals,224 
but under the AIM experience, that authority should lie with 
the SEC as a centralized body. Further, the extent of a funding 
portal‘s private liability under Title III should be clarified.225 
Thinking back to the trifold of potential problems Nomads 
could be designed to tackle—fraud, poor governance proce-
dures, and viable business plans—Nomads tackle the first two 
but not the third.226 Funding portals, on the other hand, should 
focus on a different two—fraud and viable business plans—
which are more important than corporate governance practices 
when it comes to nascent startups. The funding portal‘s prima-
ry signaling value would be to reveal that listed startups 
passed an initial screening for viability as a business and are 
not sham companies. 
 
 223. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5) (2012) (requiring funding portals to ―take . . . 
measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a background or 
securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director, and 
person holding more than 20 percent [of an issuer‘s equity]‖). 
 224. Id. § 77r(c)(1)(B). 
 225. See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 208, at 198 (―The CROWDFUND Act 
does not expressly impose fiduciary duties on funding portals. However, the 
SEC has broad authority under the CROWDFUND Act and the securities laws 
in general to promulgate rules and regulations.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also 
id. at 204 (―The CROWDFUND Act amends the 1933 Act to create a new Sec-
tion 12(a)(2)-like cause of action against issuers who sell securities under the 
crowdfunding exemption . . . . There is a possibility that funding portals may 
be considered issuers for these purposes.‖ (footnote omitted)); Gregory D. 
Deschler, Comment, Wisdom of the Intermediary Crowd: What the Proposed 
Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1145, 1155–62 (2014) (discussing potential funding portal liability). 
 226. See Mendoza, supra note 192, at 317 (―AIM created the Nomad figure 
to advise small firms that lacked the experience to properly function as listed 
companies.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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However, there are important limits on what a funding 
portal can and should be expected to do. First, there are the 
economics of funding portal viability. In short, each funding 
portal will likely need to list multitudes of small startups to 
make money, and therefore screening cannot be as intensive or 
selective as a FundersClub or CircleUp. This is both because of 
the funding portal‘s manpower time and cost and because fund-
ing portals will need to list many startups to earn fees, etc. Se-
cond, too intensive a screening process would put startups‘ fate 
in funding-portal hands and negate the ability of well-informed 
segments of the population (e.g., gamers, app developers) to se-
lect the winners. Therefore, it is important to allow Title III to 
use funding portals as reputational intermediaries for unso-
phisticated investors yet also give crowd-based wisdom a 
chance to work. 
While the specifics can be debated, it is clear that Title III 
does not make funding portals the equivalent of AIM‘s Nomads 
in the most important way—by being tied in fate and fortune to 
the companies they list. Title III should be amended to make 
funding portals true reputational intermediaries for the 
startups they list. Both theory and practice show us that repu-
tational intermediaries can signal a company‘s quality and thus 
reduce information asymmetries to a necessary level to avoid a 
market for lemons.  
  CONCLUSION   
The SEC has dual objectives of making it easier for compa-
nies to raise capital and protect investors. Often those two 
goals are at odds and must be balanced.227 Crowdfunding under 
the JOBS Act is such a situation,228 and President Obama and 
Congress clearly put their thumb on the scale of capital for-
mation over investor protection. That is fine under Title II, 
where tried-and-true angel investor methods of reducing risk 
are being successfully imported to the Internet. But Title III, 
 
 227. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 1738 (―Policymakers continually face the 
challenge of effectively balancing the benefits of encouraging small business 
formation against the investor protection goals of the securities laws.‖). 
 228. See Bradford, supra note 10, at 8 (―Crafting a crowdfunding exemption 
requires a careful balancing of investor protection and capital formation.‖); see 
also Langevoort, supra note 41, at 2 (―In the prevailing regulatory mindset, 
encouraging entrepreneurial capital formation competes with traditional in-
vestor protection. The strong bipartisan political influence of the small busi-
ness community assures that this uneasy competition will continue, with mi-
nor ebbs and flows in one direction or another.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
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which enables full-blown crowdfunding, requires changes to the 
concept of a funding portal, coupled with crowd-based wisdom, 
to avoid becoming a market for lemons.  
 
 
